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Education is often perceived as a key to development and growth, consequently, in the last
decades, many countries have increased education coverage in all education levels. The creation
of international education quality measurement programs, such as OECD’s Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment (PISA) or the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS), have further led to a focus on improving education quality. For these reasons, the last
decades have seen an increase in the importance of education in the political debate. This has
been particularly relevant in Latin America, where, additionally, education has been used, some-
times, to fight traditionally high levels of income inequality, with a significant rise in education
expenditure and coverage.
The evaluation of education policies that aim to increase education coverage, quality or equity
is, however, generally difficult. Many education policies are large-scale policies and are likely
to affect all students or workers in the population, even those not directly benefiting from the
policy. For example, students not participating in some education policy could still experience
changes in their classmate characteristics that could affect their achievement. The presence of
possible spillovers may change the direction of the effects of large-scale education policies when
all the population is included in the analysis. Therefore, analyzing solely the effects on students
participating in the policy may not give a complete picture of the effects of large-scale education
policies.
This dissertation focuses on the effects that three large-scale education policies that aimed to
improve education equity, quality and coverage, respectively, had on students and workers af-
fected differently by the policies. Particularly, each chapter analyzes the aggregate effects for the
population of each education policy and decomposes these effects on the impact suffered by dif-
ferent groups of students or workers.
In Chapter 1, I analyze the effects on test scores of a policy that aimed to increase education
equity in Chile. I study the effects of an increase in school choice for low-income students by ex-
amining a 2008 reform that made the value of Chile’s (previously flat, universal) school voucher
a step function of student income. This policy increased the proportion of private schools that
low income, eligible children could access free of charge from 0.5 to 0.7. In order to identify ag-
gregate effects and the impact within groups of students, I combine the introduction of the policy
with variation from a date of birth enrollment cutoff for 1st grade. I show that the differentiated
voucher lowered the probability that students used public schools by a small fraction and that
these students shifted out of low achievement public schools to enroll in low achievement private
schools. Nonetheless, private schools where these students enrolled had better test scores and
socioeconomic composition at baseline, and less experienced teachers and smaller class sizes than
public schools where they would have enrolled in the absence of the program. Despite the im-
provement in some school observable characteristics, I do not find any increase in test scores for
students more likely to move to private schools. Further analysis suggests a rise in test scores for
students most likely to stay in public schools. These results suggest that the policy had an overall
modest positive effect on test scores, but that this positive effect was caused by responses from
public schools instead of by students responding to the increase in school choice.
In Chapter 2, I study the impact on test scores of a policy that aimed to improve education
quality by increasing transparency of school performance in Chile. Particularly, I look at the ef-
fects of the distribution of school performance information to all families in Chile in 2011. Since I
am interested in identifying effects for different groups of students, I define a control group within
each group of students by using variation in enrollment year. Due to the presence of a date of birth
enrollment cutoff for 1st grade enrollment there is variation in enrollment year for students born
a few days apart. I combine this variation together with the timing of the distribution of infor-
mation to identify the effects of the policy. I show that the distribution of information increased
enrollment in high-performing schools, particularly for students in the third quartile of the mu-
nicipality socioeconomic distribution. Thanks to this policy, students in the third quartile were
exposed to a better socioeconomic composition of peers. Test score results suggest that there was
an overall positive effect on verbal test scores, particularly for students in the third quartile, seem-
ingly caused by an improvement in peer characteristics. However, there does not seem to be any
significant change in test scores for students less likely to change enrollment decisions in response
to the new information.
Finally, Chapter 3, examines the effects of a policy that increased tertiary education coverage in
Colombia on wages. I identify the effects on the distribution of wages using two different empir-
ical strategies: the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) reweighting method and a differences-in-
differences strategy. My results suggest that the overall distribution of wages remained constant,
once labor demand shifts and productivity changes are taken into account. In contrast, wages
increased for workers that were not at the margin of studying tertiary education, workers with
primary education or less, and the density of wages at high levels of the distribution decreased for
high school and tertiary education graduates. However, there were no effects on average wages
for workers with any of the education levels. These results suggest that the policy had heteroge-
neous effects within the wage distribution and between education levels that were not captured
by changes in average wages.
These three chapters show that large-scale education policies can, sometimes, have effects on
achievement or wages of students that are not participating in the policy, and that these effects
are not always visible in the aggregate effects. Therefore, policy-makers and researchers should
take into account the presence of spillovers or strategic responses when designing or analyzing
large-scale education policies.
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Chapter 1
Effects of Differentiated School
Vouchers: Evidence From a Policy
Change and Date of Birth Cutoffs
1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The past decades have seen the creation of dozens of school voucher programs. The motiva-
tion has been that if there were an increase in school choice and competition, it would improve
educational outcomes (Friedman, 1962). Most of these programs remain small in size (Epple et
al., 2015), and only in a few cases is their reach national. Consequently, there is still limited ev-
idence on the effects of large school choice programs on achievement. These effects may differ
from small-scale programs due, for example, to the possible re-sorting of students across schools
(e.g., Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006), or to school responses to the increased competitive pressure (e.g.,
Neilson, 2013). In addition, the literature on large-scale programs has generally focused on the
aggregate effects of such programs or used structural estimation. Thus, effects on different types
of students are barely known. Finally, Epple et al. (2015) highlights that much work remains to
be done on the design of school vouchers. For instance, should their value be flat or a function of
students’ income?
In this paper I consider a reform that allowed the value of the voucher to vary with family
income in the context of Chile’s nationwide voucher system, and I assess the effects of this reform
on different types of students. Specifically, this policy allowed public and private schools to po-
tentially receive significantly higher subsidies when they enrolled eligible, lower-income children.
In exchange, the schools had to set achievement targets, and to stop charging tuition add-ons for
eligible children. The number of private schools free of charge for eligible students increased by
about 20 percentage points in the initial years of the policy.
To analyze the effects of this policy, I use the pool of students enrolling in 1st grade. I match
these data to socioeconomic and test score information obtained from a national standardized
exam that takes place every year for 4th grade students.
I combine two sources of variation to identify the impact of this reform. First, I exploit the
timing of the policy, which was introduced in 2008. Second, I rely on the fact that, like other
countries, Chile has an enrollment cutoff — children born after June 30th must, in principle, wait a
year to enroll in school. Taken together, these facts imply that students born only a few days apart
faced potentially different amounts of school choice when they enrolled in 1st grade.
A comparison of their outcomes in a regression discontinuity (RD) design thus provides an
2
assessment of the effects of increased school choice. Additionally, by using the RD created by the
enrollment cutoff for years prior to the introduction of the differentiated voucher, I can identify
possible trends and confounders that could be biasing the RD estimates of the effects of the dif-
ferentiated voucher. Then, taking differences of the RD estimates, I obtain unbiased estimates of
the impact of the voucher reform. In contrast to most of the literature on large-scale voucher pro-
grams, this identification strategy allows me to analyze the effects of the increased school choice
separately for different types of students.
The introduction of the differentiated voucher in 2008 seemingly implies that the increase in
school choice will be a one-time event. However, in practice, information on the program seems
to have disseminated slowly, thus, in most specifications I apply a similar analysis to subsequent
cohorts. This is consistent with evidence that families did not understand their eligibility immedi-
ately, and that schools similarly were slow to understand the rules of the program. Additionally,
this reflects that families had to research which private schools were participating in the program
in order to benefit from the increased school choice.
I use the two sources of variation (i.e., timing of the policy and date of birth) to carry out
three exercises. First, I quantify and characterize compliers — students that enrolled in private
schools instead of public schools in response to the introduction of the differentiated voucher.
Second, I look at changes in enrollment choices for all students, and I compare public schools
where compliers would have enrolled in the absence of the program to the private schools where
they actually enrolled, at baseline. Finally, I analyze the effects of the increased school choice on
current school characteristics and test scores.
To quantify and characterize compliers, I instrument enrollment in private schools with the
interaction of the timing of the policy and whether a student was born after the enrollment cutoff.
From this first stage, I find that, although about 50 percent of the population was eligible for the
new voucher, only a small fraction of students changed their enrollment decisions in response to
the increased school choice.
In the second stage, I obtain the average characteristics for compliers. The most relevant result
is that around 90 percent of students that switched sectors in response to the new voucher had
mothers that completed high school education. Therefore, compliers were not the poorest students
within the group of eligible students. In addition, I use the fact that most compliers had mothers
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with high school education to classify students, since the proportion of eligible students in the
population was not stable over the period. Thus, I divide students in groups depending on their
mothers’ education, given that the resulting groups are fairly constant over the period.
Next, I use the differences in RD estimates to examine the effects on enrollment decisions.
My results show that the probability of enrolling in a public school fell slightly for students with
mothers that had basic education or less, and for students with mothers that completed high
school. This probability remained constant for students with mothers that completed university
education. Furthermore, my results show that the probability of enrolling in elite private schools
remained constant over the period. These results suggest that wealthier students did not try to
avoid differentiated voucher users through enrolling in elite private schools.
Instrumenting enrollment in public and private schools in a two-stage least squares system, I
find that, on average, compliers did not enroll in low achievement public schools and enrolled in
low achievement private schools instead. Nevertheless, the schools they moved to had better so-
cioeconomic characteristics and average test scores, smaller classes and less experienced teachers
at baseline.
Regarding current school characteristics, the results of the difference in RD estimates show
that, on average, no group of students classified according to the mother’s education experi-
ences changes in the socioeconomic composition of its peers after the introduction of the differ-
entiated voucher. Additionally, students with mothers that completed high school, on average,
have smaller class sizes and less experienced teachers, which is consistent with the changes in
enrollment choice of compliers. With respect to students with mothers that had basic education
or less — who were more likely to stay in public schools — my analysis uncovers one potential
channel through which public schools could be responding to the introduction of the differenti-
ated voucher. These students have, on average, less experienced teachers once the differentiated
voucher is introduced. This suggests that public schools may have replaced more experienced
teachers with less experienced instructors.
Despite the fact that compliers enrolled in schools with generally better characteristics, the dif-
ference in RD estimates shows that there are no effects on average test scores for students with
mothers that completed high school. This result is consistent with a part of the literature in school
choice that finds small or inexistent effects for students transferring to better schools (e.g., Ab-
4
dulkadiroglu et al., 2011; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014).
In contrast, the average test scores of students with low education mothers — those were
more likely to stay in public schools — increased. This is consistent with another strand of the
school choice literature which suggests that school choice leads to responses by public schools
(e.g., Hoxby, 2003; Chakrabarti, 2008). This impact in test scores could be related to the decrease in
average experience of teachers for this group of students. But other mechanisms could be at work
as well.
This paper relates to several strands of previous work. First, identification of the effects of
large-scale voucher programs is generally difficult. These programs distribute vouchers nation-
wide to all students who want to use them, and may have effects on non-voucher users through
changes in student composition or other school characteristics. Therefore, it is hard to define con-
trol groups. Generally, the literature has either focused on the aggregate effects of such programs
(e.g., Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Bohlmark and Lindahl, 2008) or used structural estimation (e.g.,
Neilson, 2013; Bravo, Mukhopadhyay and Todd, 2010). In a controlled experimental setting, Mu-
ralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) considered the effects of the introduction of targeted school
vouchers in India on voucher users, students remaining in public schools and students already
enrolled in private schools. My identification strategy allows me to quantify and characterize
students responding to the introduction of a national differentiated voucher in Chile, compare
schools where responding students would have enrolled and actually enrolled in response to the
policy, and analyze the impact of the policy on students affected in different ways.
Since this large-scale program was overlaid on top of the national voucher system, its effects
may have been more limited and thus relevant to work on small-scale programs. Thus, I also con-
tribute to a broad literature on school choice that has found mixed results on outcomes of students
that transfer to private or charter schools (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011; Deming et al., 2014;
Rouse, 1998) or to higher quality schools (e.g., Deming et al., 2014). My estimates suggest that stu-
dents that enrolled in private schools instead of public schools, due to the differentiated voucher,
did not significantly increase achievement, despite the improvement in some school characteris-
tics.
Additionally, students left behind in public schools also have been shown to benefit from
voucher programs, especially in public schools likely to be affected by the increased competi-
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tion (Figlio and Hart, 2014; Hoxby, 2003). In this paper I show that, even though the program did
not generate a large re-sorting of students, students more likely to stay in public schools experi-
enced increases in average test scores. Even though many mechanisms could be responsible for
this result, I find some evidence of response by public schools through changes in their teaching
teams.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the following section describes the differ-
entiated voucher program and the Chilean school system. Section 3 explains the possible effects
that the introduction of the differentiated voucher could have generated, then, section 4 discusses
the data used in this paper and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 describes my empirical
strategy and the differences in RD design, followed by section 6 that discusses the characteristics
of students who switched enrollment decisions in response to the policy. Section 7 presents my
results and section 8 discusses some robustness checks. Finally, section 8 concludes this paper.
1.2 BACKGROUND
In 1981, school vouchers were introduced in Chile. These vouchers were universal and nation-
wide: every student had access to a voucher of equal monetary value.
The introduction of vouchers defined three main school types, on the basis of financing and
control, that have remained unchanged since 1981:
1. Public (or municipal) schools. These schools are controlled by the municipalities and funded
centrally through a per-student payment for every child attending their schools. Public
schools can only legally turn away students if they are oversubscribed.
2. Elite private schools. These private institutions do not receive public funding and are financed
through tuition fees. They account for around 7% of total enrollment and serve mainly
high-income households.
3. Voucher (private) schools. These schools are privately controlled and up to 1993 were funded
exclusively through the same per-student payment as public schools. Since 1993 these schools
can charge supplementary tuition.1 If they choose to do so, the per-student payment is pro-
gressively reduced as tuition increases, but this reduction does not offset the tuition revenues
1Law 19.247 of September 15, 1993.
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except for very high tuition levels. In contrast to public schools, voucher schools were al-
lowed to select students up to 2009.2
Supplementary financing for specific types of school was introduced after 1981, such as the
P-900 program that transferred resources to schools with low absolute performance, but the basic
features of the school voucher program remained constant until 2008.
In the late 1990s, some observers began to suggest a differentiated per-student voucher that
might correct educational inequities. However, the voucher payments remained flat until 2008,
when a new differentiated voucher was created through the Preferential School Subsidy Law.3
The Preferential School Subsidy Law created a two-step voucher that depends on the socioe-
conomic characteristics of students. All students still receive the original flat voucher, but now
participating schools receive an additional amount for each eligible student enrolled.
Through the new differentiated voucher the government wanted to recognize that educating
low socioeconomic status students is more costly than educating wealthier students. Furthermore,
it hoped that low income students (eligible students) would be more appealing to selective par-
ticipating voucher schools due to the additional payment, and that, as a consequence, voucher
schools would have greater incentives to locate in low-income neighborhoods.
In order to receive the differentiated voucher, schools must formally join the program by sign-
ing a four-year agreement with the Ministry of Education.4 If they do so, schools receive an addi-
tional payment worth around 50% of the flat voucher amount for each eligible student enrolled.
Participating schools can also receive an additional subsidy if the school has a high percentage of
eligible students.5 This extra subsidy is much smaller in size than the differentiated voucher, and
increases with the proportion of eligible students in the school, with discontinuities at 15, 30, 45
and 60 percent of the total student population in the school.
In exchange, participating schools commit to provide a plan that explains how the differenti-
ated voucher resources will be spent to improve the school. They are held accountable for these
2Article 12 in Law 20.370 of September 12, 2009. Carrasco et al. (2014) suggest that voucher schools continue to
select students.
3Ley de Subvención Escolar Preferencial, number 20.248.
4The agreement is called Convenio de Igualdad de Oportunidades.
5The additional subsidy is called Subvención por Concentración.
7
expenses and must set achievement targets in terms of standardized test results with a special fo-
cus on increasing test scores for eligible students.6 Additionally, this agreement forbids selecting
or expelling students between kindergarten and 6th grade and finally, it also forbids charging any
compulsory fees to eligible students.
This last condition implied that due to the participation of voucher schools in the differentiated
voucher program, the proportion of free voucher schools for eligible students jumped from around
0.52 in 2007 to 0.65 in 2008, as shown in Figure 1.1, and then rose up smoothly to 0.71 in 2010. Thus,
there was an immediate increase in school choice for eligible students followed by additional
subsequent increases.
Enrollment responses were gradual, additionally, because there were difficulties in inform-
ing parents about the policy and about eligibility. Initially eligibility information was distributed
through letters to families, sometimes sent through the school where the students were enrolled.
This information was not always understood by families (Soto Aranda, 2011).
Starting in 2010, the responsibility to inform parents about the differentiated voucher program
was transferred to the schools, with the Ministry of Education distributing eligibility informa-
tion by logging into a website. The computer access requirement may reduce access to eligibility
information for the poorest eligible students.
On top of the difficulties to obtain information on the differentiated voucher program and
eligibility, parents additionally need to research about voucher school participation in the program
if they want to benefit from the increased school choice.
As a result, the effects of the policy on enrollment choices were smooth over time, as parents
slowly learned about the differentiated voucher program, eligibility and participating schools.
Therefore, in my analysis I will consider that students that enrolled in 2008 and each subsequent
year were exposed to a new increase in school choice for each year, as parents learned about the
differentiated voucher program and were more able to respond to the increase in school choice.
6Minimum increases in test scores were set by the Ministry of Education.
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1.2.1 Eligibility
Approximately the poorest 50% of the population is eligible for the differentiated voucher pro-
gram. Eligibility is determined according to socioeconomic indicators. Specifically, a student is
eligible if any of the following conditions are met: (i) the student belongs the lowest third of the
distribution of scores of a government instrument that measures the family capability to generate
income, (ii) the student participates in a social program that targets the 10% poorest population,7
or (iii) the student is classified in the poorest group of the National Health Fund (FONASA). Fi-
nally, students could be temporarily deemed eligible according to socioeconomic indicators.
In 2010, 55% of eligible students were eligible through criteria (1), 30% were eligible through
criteria (2), and the remaining 15% through other criteria.
Unfortunately, the instrument used to identify most eligible students, the Ficha de Protección
Social, was introduced in 2007, and it was not administered to students who could be eligible for
the differentiated voucher until 2009.8
Additionally, since this same instrument was used to determine eligibility for most social ben-
efits in Chile, citizens had incentives to reduce their scores. Many of them learned how to game
the instrument and became eligible,9 which led to small or even nonexistent differences between
eligible and ineligible students as determined by the instrument.
Consequently, eligibility information is not suited to analyze the effects of the differentiated
voucher program. Therefore, to analyze the effects of this policy I characterize students respond-
ing to the program, as explained in section 6, and use the education level of the mother to classify
students.
1.3 POTENTIAL PARTIAL AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS
In a regular school voucher program, in which students can use school vouchers to pay for
tuition in private schools, there are three types of students depending on voucher use: (1) voucher
7Chile Solidario.
8Herrera, Larrañaga and Telias (2010).
9Poblete, J. (2012, April 30) Detectan 50.512 casos de información falsa en ficha de protección social, La Tercera. retrieved
from: http://diario.latercera.com/.
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users, students that enroll in private schools instead of public schools using the voucher, (2) stu-
dents left behind in public schools, and (3) students that were already enrolled in private schools.
Suppose that country A introduces a small-scale voucher program in which, for example, a
small number of students is eligible for school vouchers that allow them to enroll in private
schools. Assuming that private schools are different from public schools, students in group (1),
voucher users, would attend schools with different characteristics with respect to the public school
they would have enrolled in if the voucher did not exist. These students may or may not experi-
ence increases in test scores.
If the voucher program is very small-scale, the change in student composition in public schools
would be minimal, and students remaining in public schools should not be affected by voucher
users leaving public schools. Additionally, public schools are unlikely to feel threatened by the
increased competition.
Similarly, if voucher users are evenly distributed among private schools, students in private
schools receiving these voucher users should not be affected. The number of voucher users would
be too small to have an effect on the socioeconomic composition of private schools and to have
any negative effect on students already enrolled in private schools.
In summary, the effects of a small-scale voucher program would be dominated by the effects
on voucher users, since non-voucher users would be barely affected.
The differentiated school voucher program in Chile is, in contrast, a large-scale program. Ap-
proximately 50% of the population were eligible for the differentiated voucher. Additionally, par-
ticipating voucher schools were not allowed to select students anymore. Almost 70% of eligible
students were enrolled in public schools in the pre-policy period and, thanks to the differenti-
ated voucher, could enroll in participating voucher schools for free. However, this program was
a reform to the already existing national voucher system. Therefore, its effects on re-sorting the
students could be large, but also could be small if all students who wanted to enroll in voucher
schools were already enrolled in voucher schools using the existing (flat) voucher.
Suppose that eligible students have a strong preference for voucher schools over public schools,
but, before the differentiated voucher was introduced, were prevented from enrolling in voucher
schools due to student selection and school prices. If this is the case, in response to the differen-
tiated voucher program, a large number of eligible students could enroll in participating voucher
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schools instead of public schools. As a consequence, if the number of students switching enroll-
ment is sufficiently large, all 3 groups of students could be affected. Additionally, the possible
benefits for voucher users of enrolling in a voucher school may be dampened.
In this case, voucher users would leave public schools to enroll in voucher schools that had, at
baseline, better characteristics. However, since the poorest half of the population is eligible for the
differentiated school voucher and participating voucher schools are not allowed to select students
anymore, participating voucher schools could potentially be flooded with voucher users in a way
that could affect the school characteristics. In an extreme case, and assuming no differences in
value-added, it is possible that voucher schools accepting voucher users would end up with the
same socioeconomic characteristics as public schools and with larger class sizes, causing a decline
in achievement for students transferring from public schools.
Alternatively, these students may distribute evenly across schools and may not significantly
affect student composition, or simply benefit from more effective teachers in voucher schools and
achieve test scores.
Students left behind in public schools may also be affected. If a sufficiently large number
of students leaves public schools, they may have smaller class sizes, better teacher per student
ratios, and better targeting of instruction (Duflo et al., 2011). Additionally, public schools may
actively compete for enrollment, and carry out changes at the school level to improve achievement.
Therefore, it is possible that students left behind in public schools are positively affected.
Another possibility is that the best students in public schools leave due to the differentiated
voucher, and students in public schools have a worse peer composition. In the case in which
teachers do not respond by readapting their teaching targets, and schools do not respond, the
negative effect due to the worse peer composition could dominate, leading to a decline in achieve-
ment by students left behind in public schools.
Finally, students already enrolled in voucher schools may experience negative consequences
caused by the change in student composition in participating voucher schools. If the change is
sufficiently large, it could slow teaching pace and lower teaching targets, causing a reduction in
learning and test scores for students that were already enrolled in voucher schools.
Also, these students may respond to the change in school characteristics by deciding to enroll
somewhere else as, for example, in non-participating voucher schools or elite private schools.
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In contrast, another possibility is that as the differentiated voucher program was overlaid on
the existing voucher system in Chile, very few eligible students switched enrollment decisions.
If this is the case, the impact would be the same as in a small-scale program, with the variation
that public schools may respond. Given the characteristics of the program, potential competition
for public schools increased. Thus, if the perceived increase in school competition is sufficiently
large, public schools may try to improve achievement in order to keep students from transferring
to voucher schools.
Consequently, as the differentiated voucher was an addition to the already existing national
voucher system, the effects of this program on re-sorting and achievement could be large or small.
If the effects on re-sorting are large, all students, including the non-voucher users and ineligi-
ble students, could be affected, and changes in achievement could go in either direction. If the
effects on re-sorting are small, there could still be effects on achievement if the public schools
respond to the increase in potential competition. Therefore, since the effects of the introduction
of the differentiated voucher program are theoretically ambiguous, empirical evidence is needed.
The remainder of this paper will try to clarify which of these scenarios best fits the effects of the
introduction of the differentiated voucher in Chile.
1.4 DATA
I rely on two sources of administrative data, the Chilean Ministry of Education and the Educa-
tion Quality Assurance Agency.
From the Ministry of Education, I use the individual enrollment information for all students in
primary education from 2005 to 2014, including date of birth, grade, year and school enrolled in
and the municipality of residence. Additionally, I use school information from 2005 to 2014, in-
cluding type of school, school municipality and total enrollment, school average prices for voucher
schools from 2005 to 2013, teacher hiring and firing, and teacher characteristics from 2005 to 2013.
Finally, I use information about the differentiated voucher program at the school level, includ-
ing school participation from 2008 to 2014, and funds received and used from the differentiated
voucher at the school level for 2008-2012.
From the Education Quality Assurance Agency I use individual standardized test results for
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4th grade of basic education, and survey information on socioeconomic characteristics, including
parents’ education and family gross monthly income from 2008 to 2013.
I will use the sample of students enrolling in 1st grade each year from 2005 to 2010 to determine
the effects of the differentiated voucher on school enrollment choices and achievement. Since there
are costs related to school switching, I will focus on the initial school enrollment decision, students
enrolling in 1st grade.10
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics can be found in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2. Table 1.1 shows summary statistics
of the sample of students and schools used by year of enrollment in 1st grade, while table 1.2
shows average characteristics of schools by type and year.
As shown in Table 1.1, there was a steady decrease in enrollment in public schools during the
period, with a corresponding increase in enrollment in voucher schools. With regard to test scores,
average test scores for a standardized exam carried out in 4th grade increased smoothly during the
period, and, on average, do not seem to improve significantly more for students that enrolled once
the differentiated voucher program had been introduced.
Finally, the last panel of Table 1.1 shows that the number of schools was relatively stable over
the period. However, there were changes in the composition of schools in the market, with a
reduction in the proportion of public schools and a corresponding increase on the proportion of
voucher schools. Almost all public schools participated in the differentiated voucher since the
first year, but only approximately 50% of voucher schools participated in the first year of the
differentiated voucher program. Voucher school participation in the program increased smoothly
in the following years.
Table 1.2 shows changes in school characteristics by school type over time. Average class size is
largest in voucher schools and lowest in elite private schools. While class sizes in these two school
types remained fairly constant, class size fell in public schools once the differentiated voucher
10Approximately 42% of children were enrolled in kindergarten in the school where they attended 1st grade two
years in advance, and approximately 55% were already enrolled in the same school on the year before starting 1st
grade. However, most of the effect of the differentiated voucher in school choice comes from the 45% of students
enrolling in a new school in 1st grade. Changes in school choice can also be observed for kindergarten levels but in a
smaller magnitude than for 1st grade enrollment.
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program was established. Thus, the number of teachers per student increased in public schools
starting in 2008. In terms of average school size, all three school types are quite similar, even
though public schools suffered from a decline in total enrollment during the period. Socioeco-
nomic composition of students in the three school types is as expected, with public schools having
the lowest socioeconomic status students, voucher schools middle class students and elite private
schools high socioeconomic status students.
With respect to teacher characteristics, almost the totality of teachers in all three school types
hold a degree in education, but the percentage of educated teachers is slightly higher in public
schools. Even so, the proportion of educated teachers increased somewhat for all three types of
schools in 2008, when the differentiated voucher was introduced. The most experienced teachers
are those in public schools. However, the average teacher experience (and age) fell in public
schools in 2008, and it continued decreasing in the following years in public and, to a lower extent,
voucher schools. This seems due to a change in teaching teams in public schools and, in a smaller
scale, in voucher schools that started once the differentiated voucher was introduced, as can be
observed with changes in the proportion of newly hired and terminated teachers.
The average teacher evaluation score,11 that is compulsory for all teachers in public schools, in-
creased in 2008 once the differentiated voucher program was introduced. This increase may have
been caused by a rise in effort by teachers in response to the achievement goals set by the differ-
entiated voucher program, the perceived higher school competition, or to a higher effectiveness
of newly hired teachers in public schools.
The most immediate effect of the differentiated voucher program was the increase in per-
student expenditures. This rose in public and voucher schools on average, with the largest in-
crease in public schools.
Finally, average standardized scores are highest in elite private schools, followed by voucher
schools, then public schools. This is consistent with the differences in socioeconomic characteris-
tics of students among the three school types. However, while the differentiated voucher program
11The average teacher evaluation score is the score assigned to teachers in public schools by an institution associated
with the Ministry of education based on the analysis of a recording of a class and the teaching materials prepared by
the teacher, together with a self-evaluation, an evaluation by a peer teacher and by managers. It intends to evaluate the
effectiveness of the teacher and this evaluation is compulsory for teachers in public schools since 2005. Teachers newly
hired in public schools are not evaluated on the first year of experience.
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increased public schools test scores, the effect on voucher school average test scores was more
modest and even somewhat negative in the first year of the program.
1.5 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
I use two sources of variation to analyze the effects of the differentiated voucher program on
enrollment choices, school characteristics, and achievement. The first is the timing of the policy,
and the second is exogenous variation on students’ 1st grade enrollment year.
The differentiated voucher program was implemented in 2008 but, due to the information is-
sues explained above, the distribution of information was slow. Consequently, enrollment re-
sponses were smooth over time, since in practice, parents of eligible students faced a new increase
in school choice as they became more informed. This implies that all students who enrolled in 1st
grade in 2008 or later could have modified their school choices in response to the introduction of
the differentiated voucher. Therefore, the cohorts that enrolled in 2008 or later will be considered
“treated” cohorts.
The second source of variation originates in Chile’s enrollment cutoff dates for 1st grade. The
official enrollment cutoff in Chile is March 31: all students whose sixth birthday is later than
March 31 should delay enrollment by one year. However, in practice, a decree from the Ministry
of Education allows schools to apply later enrollment cutoffs with the latest possible being June
30. This cutoff is the most common in Chile, as shown in McEwan and Shapiro (2008), and is the
one I use in this paper.12
The June 30 enrollment cutoff implies that, for example, students whose sixth birthday was
between April 1 and June 30, 2007, had a positive probability of enrolling in 1st grade in 2007,
while students whose sixth birthday was after June 30, 2007, had essentially zero probability.
As a result, the enrollment cutoff creates a discontinuity in enrollment probability and, con-
sequently, in exposure to the differentiated voucher for students enrolling in 2007/2008. This set
up can be used in a Regression Discontinuity Design to determine the effects of the differentiated
voucher on enrollment choices and achievement.
12Despite the existence of multiple enrollment cutoffs, public and voucher schools do not seem to use the choice
of enrollment cutoff strategically. For all three types of schools the largest discontinuity happens on June 30 and the
magnitude of the discontinuity is similar between public and voucher schools.
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Let yi(1) be the outcome of interest for student i if he was exposed to the increased school
choice caused by the introduction of the differentiated voucher at the time of enrollment, and let
yi(0) be the outcome if he was not exposed at time of enrollment. Ideally, I would compute the
average impact of the increase in the number of free voucher schools on enrollment choices and
test scores as: α = E(yi(1)− yi(0)).
Since this is not possible, I will compare students whose sixth birthday was on or before the
June 30 enrollment cutoff for 2007, 2008 and 2009 to students whose sixth birthday was after those
enrollment cutoffs and hence had to delay enrollment to 2008, 2009 and 2010. Eligible students
who had to delay enrollment were more informed and, in practice, exposed to an increase in the
proportion of free voucher schools, thanks to the differentiated voucher.
Due to the two enrollment cutoffs within the same year, enrollment is not a deterministic func-
tion of date of birth for students who were born between April 1 and June 30. Consequently, date
of birth affects the probability that a student is exposed to the increase in school choice at the time
of enrollment in the following way: 1 = P(T = 1|B > 0) > P(T = 1|B ≤ 0) > 0, where T is
the probability of being exposed to the increase in school choice for eligible students at time of
enrollment, and B is the distance from the sixth birthday to the June 30th enrollment cutoff (see
figure 1.2 for the 2007/2008 example).
This implies that the regression discontinuity design estimates that use the date of birth as the
running variable are actually intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates. Assuming that birth dates are random
and that student characteristics are continuous near cutoffs, 13 in the absence of other confounders,
the regression discontinuity estimator would provide unbiased estimates of the effects on the out-
come of interest of being born at either side of the cutoff. The intent-to-treat RD estimate for the
13Table A.1 in the appendix shows that there are no significant differences in socioeconomic characteristics of students
born at either side of the cutoff. However, Table A.2 shows that density of births is not stable around the cutoff.
Cesarean sections are widely used in Chile and not performed on weekends. In two of the five cohorts used, July 1 fell
on a weekend, which could be causing the fall in density of births. Additionally, seasonality in births could explain
changes in density of births. This policy was discussed for the first time in October 2005, therefore, since mothers
of students that turned six around the 2007/2008 enrollment cutoff got pregnant in 2000/2001, it is impossible that
there was manipulation of day of birth in response to the differentiated voucher program. Nevertheless, since the
socioeconomic characteristics of students at either side of the cutoff are similar and changes in the density of births
cannot be related to the policy, due to the timing of the policy, this fall in birth densities should not cause any bias to
the differences in RD estimates.
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differentiated voucher effect is given by:
αITT,RD = limB↓0E[y|B]− limB↑0E[y|B] (1.1)
Which can be obtained by estimating the following equation through ordinary least squares:
yi = β + θPosti + f (Bi) + εi (1.2)
where B is the distance from the sixth birthday to the June 30 enrollment cutoff, Posti is an indica-
tor variable that equals 1 if the student was born after the enrollment cutoff, and f (Bi) is a flexible
parametric specification that includes higher-order polynomials of sixth birthday and can vary on
either side of the enrollment cutoff. My main specification uses a linear spline on sixth birthday
distance to cutoff interacted with a dummy indicating whether the student falls to the left or the
right of the cutoff. The coefficient θ in (1.2) represents the estimate of the intent-to-treat effect of
the differentiated voucher, α̂ITT,RD = θ̂.
It is possible that there existed pre-trends on enrollment choices, since as seen in the previous
section, enrollment in public schools was already falling before the differentiated voucher. There
may also be or that there are “age-at-test” or “enrollment age” effects. For example, McEwan and
Shapiro (2008) show increases in fourth grade standardized test scores of more than 0.3 standard
deviations due to the differences in age caused by the enrollment cutoffs. In this case, the regres-
sion discontinuity estimate from above would also capture these confounders, leading to biased
estimates.
Assuming that the confounder is constant over time, the RD estimate for years prior to the
differentiated voucher program would converge to λ, where λ is the pre-existing trend on enroll-
ment or the “age-at-test” or “enrollment age” effect, while the RD estimate for the initial years of
differentiated voucher existence would converge to λ + α.
Thus, I take differences of the RD estimators to account for these possible confounders (Carneiro,
Løken and Salvanes, 2015). By estimating equation (1.2) for years prior to the differentiated
voucher program was in place, I obtain θ̂pre → λ. Then, I obtain an estimate for θ̂post → λ + α
through the estimation of (1.2) for the cohorts that enrolled once the differentiated voucher had
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been implemented, from 2008 on. Finally, I can estimate the effect of the reform as α̂RD−D =
θ̂post − θ̂pre.
The RD-D estimate can also be obtained by interacting a “treated” term in regression (1.2), as
follows:
yi = β + θPosti + ρTreatedi + αPosti × Treatedi + f (Bi) + ui (1.3)
where Treatedi is an indicator equal to one if the student belongs to the cohort that enrolled in
2007/2008 or later, f (Bi) is additionally interacted with Treatedi, and the other variables are de-
fined as above.
The coefficient on the interaction of the dummy for whether the student was born after the
enrollment cutoff (Posti) and the indicator for whether the student belongs to the cohort exposed
to the program (Treated), α̂, estimates the intent-to-treat effect of the program.
I will focus my analysis on a 90-day window around the June 30 cutoff, with day 0 representing
the last cohort “untreated”. Results are robust to the use of alternative bandwidth sizes.
1.6 COMPLIER CHARACTERISTICS
The introduction of the differentiated voucher increased the number of free private schools for
eligible students, as shown in Figure 1.1, and, consequently, incentivized eligible students to enroll
in voucher schools accepting the differentiated voucher instead of public schools.
However, as discussed previously, there is indication that information on the differentiated
voucher did not disseminate instantaneously. Information about eligibility was hard to under-
stand or to access, since from 2010 on, the information was distributed online, what could prevent
the poorest families from accessing it. This implies that less educated families may have had more
trouble accessing and understanding eligibility information and therefore, have not been able to
respond in their enrollment choices to the program. Additionally, as suggested by Carrasco et al.
(2014), voucher schools may still have been selecting students, so not all eligible students may
have faced the same school choice at time of enrollment.
This section takes into account these facts and investigates the characteristics of students who
took advantage of the increased school choice to enroll in voucher instead of public schools.
Imagine the simplest case in which students can be “induced” to treatment or not, where this
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is denoted by the binary variable Zi. Treatment is binary and represented by variable Di, and Xi is
an indicator for whether student i has predetermined characteristic X. Denote D0i the value that
Di would have taken if Zi = 0, if the student was not induced to treatment, and D1i if Zi = 1.
Then, extending Abadie (2002), in this simple case I can compute the proportion of compliers that
had characteristic X as:
P(Xi = 1|D1i > D0i) =
E[XiDi|Zi = 1]− E[XiDi|Zi = 0]
E[Di|Zi = 1]− E[Di|Zi = 0]
(1.4)
Following this logic, I can use two-stage least squares to compute the proportion of students
with characteristic X that enrolled in voucher schools instead of public schools in response to the
differentiated school voucher program with the following system:
Di = θ + ψPosti × Treatedi + φPosti + ηTreatedi + g(Bi) + νi (1.5)
Xi × Di = α + βPosti + ρTreatedi + γDi + f (Bi) + ui (1.6)
where Di is an indicator variable equal to one if student i enrolled in a voucher school in 1st
grade, Posti an indicator variable that equals one if the student was born after the enrollment
cutoff, Treatedi an indicator variable for whether the student belongs to the “treated” cohorts, and
g(Bi) and f (Bi) are linear splines on distance of sixth birthday to enrollment cutoff, interacted
with whether the student was born to the right or left of the cutoff and interacted again with the
Treatedi indicator.
The coefficient γ in equation (1.6) gives the proportion of compliers with characteristic X. In
this case, students “induced” into treatment would be those born after the enrollment cutoff in the
“treated” cohorts, as they faced increased school choice.
Since information disseminated slowly, more parents learned about the increase in school
choice every year following the introduction of the differentiated voucher. Therefore, students
who turned six after the enrollment cutoff for 2007, 2008 and 2009 had more information and were
more likely to benefit from the increased school choice and enroll in voucher instead of public
schools than students born before the enrollment cutoff for these years. The slow dissemination
of information is consistent with the increase in the proportion of compliers over the period, as
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shown in Figure 1.3. Thus, I will consider students born around the 2007, 2008 and 2009 enroll-
ment cutoffs as students in the “treated” cohorts.
For this system to identify the characteristics of compliers, the monotonicity assumption needs to
hold. That means, all students that were exposed to the increase in school choice had to change
enrollment decisions in the same direction. Therefore, all students that responded to the increase
in school choice had to increase the probability of enrolling in voucher schools only.
I provide suggestive evidence that this assumption holds by looking at the effect of the intro-
duction of the differentiated voucher program on the probability of enrolling in different types of
schools in Table 1.3. First of all, results show that even though almost 50% of the population was
eligible, the probability of enrolling in a public school only fell in around 1.5%. This amount is the
percentage of compliers in the population.
Regarding the monotonicity assumption, results show a significant decrease in the probability
of enrolling in public schools in the post-policy cohort with respect to the pre-policy cohort and a
corresponding increase in the probability of enrolling in voucher schools. These two coefficients
are significant and very similar, indicating that almost all students that did not enroll in public
schools enrolled in voucher schools instead. Row (C) shows no significant changes in the prob-
ability of enrolling in elite private schools, which additionally suggests that students were not
exiting voucher schools to avoid differentiated voucher users. These results give support to the
monotonicity assumption and suggest that the system of equations (1.5) and (1.6) should identify
the characteristics of students that enroll in voucher schools instead of public schools.
Unfortunately, this approach cannot be used to estimate effects on test scores for students that
switched enrollment decisions in response to the increased school choice. Since the differentiated
voucher could have induced changes in schools through changes in student composition or in-
creased funds, the exclusion restriction does not hold in this case. This means, the introduction of
the differentiated voucher could be correlated directly with test scores, independently of changes
in enrollment of the individual student.
Results for the characteristics of compliers can be found in column (1) of Table 1.4. Since stan-
dard errors are very large, partly due to the small first stage on voucher enrollment, the estimated
proportions of students in each group add up to slightly more than one. Regardless, about 90%
of compliers belong to the group of students with mothers that completed high school education,
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while the remainder of compliers had mothers with basic education or less. Additional complier
characteristics can be found in Table A.8 in the appendix.
When comparing these proportions to the proportions in the actual population in column (2), it
can be observed that “compliers”, students that switched enrollment decisions in response to the
program, come overwhelmingly from the group of students with mothers that completed high
school. These results suggest that, either due to information issues or to selection on the school
side, compliers were the wealthiest eligible students in the school market.
As discussed above, another difficulty is that the proportion of eligible students is not stable
over time, due to the change of the instrument and to gaming by citizens to gain access to other
social benefits. Thus, eligibility information cannot be used to classify students.14
In view of the results in Table 1.4, I can use the classification of students by mother education
level to define three groups of students depending on their responses to the differentiated voucher
program: (1) students with mothers that completed basic education or less, who are eligible but are
not highly represented in the group of compliers, (2) students with mothers that completed high
school, who represent the majority of compliers and, (3) students with mothers that completed
university that are mostly not eligible and in most cases were already enrolled in voucher and
elite private schools.15
The proportion of students that belong to each group is fairly constant over time, as shown
in Table 1.5. Thus, I will use these three categories of students to determine the effects of the
differentiated voucher in the next section.
As can be observed in Table 1.6, all of these groups contain students in public and private
schools together with compliers (as discussed for Table 1.5). However, enrollment patterns show
that students with mothers that had basic education or less generally attend public schools, the
group with mothers that completed high school contains students in public and private schools,
together with most compliers, and the majority of students with mothers that completed univer-
sity are enrolled in private and elite private schools.
14The instrument used to determine eligibility was introduced in 2007, and it was not administered to students who
could be eligible for the differentiated voucher until 2009.
15Summary statistics for students in each group in the post-policy period can be found in Table A.9 in the appendix.
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1.7 RESULTS
This section presents three sets of results. The first illustrates the effect on 1st grade enrollment
decisions of the increase in school choice caused by the introduction of the differentiated voucher
program. The second looks at changes in school characteristics encountered by students. Finally,
the third examines the effects of the differentiated voucher on standardized test scores.
Results are presented in two different ways, a figure and a table. First of all, differences in indi-
vidual cohort RD estimates with respect to RD estimates for the last pre-policy cohort (2006/2007)
and their 95% confidence intervals are presented for all three groups of mother education in a fig-
ure. Then, RD estimates pooling all pre-policy cohorts and all post-policy cohorts and differences
in these RD estimates are presented in a table.
In the figure, each one of the differences in RD coefficients represents the increase/decrease in
the outcome of interest for students who were born after the enrollment cutoff for that individ-
ual cohort once possible stable confounders, such as “age-at-test” effects, are taken into account.
Difference in RD coefficients for cohorts that enrolled in 2007/2008, and subsequent cohorts, with
respect to the RD coefficient for 2006/2007 estimate the effect of the differentiated voucher once
the confounder has been accounted for. Therefore, if the difference in RD coefficient for the cohort
that enrolled in 2007/2008 is positive and significant, that means that the effect on the outcome of
the differentiated voucher is positive.
With regard to the table, the corresponding table presents RD coefficients of the outcome of in-
terest and differences in the RD coefficients for all three groups of mother education. Column (1)
presents estimates of the confounders, that means, RD coefficients pooling all pre-policy cohorts
(students within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for years 2005 and 2006), column (2) RD coeffi-
cients using all post-policy cohorts (students within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for years 2007,
2008 and 2009) and columns (3) shows the RD-D estimates, the difference between the post-policy
RD estimate with respect to the pre-policy RD estimate.
As mentioned in the empirical strategy section, all the reported differences in regression dis-
continuity estimates are differences in intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates, since the probability of en-
rolling in the next year does not sharply increase from 0 to 1 for students born after the enrollment
cutoff. This probability, that would correspond to the first stage in a fuzzy regression disconti-
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nuity design, increases by around 0.4 for students born after the enrollment cutoff. Therefore, if
we were interested in the average treatment on the treated (ATT) effects, these results would be
roughly similar to the presented estimates multiplied by one over 0.4, that means, by 2.5.
1.7.1 Enrollment choices
One of the immediate effects of the differentiated voucher program was an increase in the
number of free voucher schools for eligible students in 2008, shown in Figure 1.1. However, as
discussed above, due to informational problems, enrollment responses are likely to have hap-
pened also in later years, as parents slowly learned about the differentiated voucher program,
eligibility and school participation.
In response to the increase in school choice, Figure 1.4 and Table 1.7 show that there was a
decrease in the probability of enrolling in public schools with respect to the pre-policy cohorts for
students with mothers that had basic education or less and students with mothers that completed
high school education of around 1.6%. Given the magnitude of the program, this result is per-
haps surprising: even though around 50% of the population was eligible, only around 1.5% of all
students switched enrollment decisions in response to the differentiated voucher program in the
first three years of the program. However, as the differentiated voucher was a reform to the exist-
ing voucher system, it is possible that most eligible students with a strong preference for voucher
schools were already enrolling in voucher schools.
Additionally, this fall was significant only for students with mothers that completed high
school, which is expected, 90% of students that switched enrollment decisions belonged to this
group. Students with mothers that completed high school were more likely to respond in their
enrollment decisions than students with less educated mothers for two reasons: (1) better under-
standing and access to differentiated voucher program and eligibility information, and (2) student
selection by voucher schools, even though it was forbidden, as argued by Carrasco et al. (2014).
For this group, the fall in enrollment in public schools already occurred in the first year of the
program, but enrollment in public schools fell at about the same rate in the following year and
even more rapidly two years after the introduction of the differentiated voucher. This persistent
effect in the decrease in enrollment in public schools is consistent with the slow distribution of
information over time.
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Students that switched enrollment decisions in response to the differentiated voucher program
may have enrolled in schools with different characteristics. Using a parallel technique to the pre-
vious section, I instrument enrollment in voucher and public schools, in a two-stage least squares
system, to compare public schools where students would have enrolled in the absence of the dif-
ferentiated voucher program (counterfactual public schools) to voucher schools where students
actually enrolled (destination voucher schools) at baseline.
Formally, I run the following two-stage least squares system:
Dit = θ + ψPosti × Treatedi + φPosti + ηTreatedi + g(Bi) + νi (1.7)
Si × Dit = α + βPosti + ρTreatedi + γDit + f (Bi) + ui (1.8)
where Dit is the probability of enrolling in school of type t, Si is the school characteristic of
interest, and Posti, Treatedi and g(Bi) and f (Bi) are as defined above. The coefficient γ in equation
(1.8) gives the average of characteristic S for voucher schools where compliers enrolled or for
counterfactual public schools, public schools where compliers ceased to enroll.
This method cannot be used to look at current school characteristics since the exclusion restric-
tion may not hold for current characteristics. If schools experience changes in characteristics in
response to compliers leaving public schools and enrolling in voucher schools, to the increased
funds or to more school competition, then the introduction of the differentiated voucher program
would be directly correlated with school characteristics. Thus, the two stage least squares system
would not only be estimating the changes in school characteristics due to changes in complier
choices.
Table 1.8 shows that, at baseline, students that enrolled in voucher schools instead of public
schools thanks to the differentiated voucher, enrolled in smaller voucher schools that had, on av-
erage, class sizes about five fewer students. These schools had higher test scores and better socioe-
conomic composition, with a larger average socioeconomic index, about 20% fewer students with
less educated mothers, and around 13% more students with highly educated mothers. Schools
where students enrolled, however, had around 10% fewer teachers with a completed degree in
education with respect to the public schools where they would have enrolled, and teachers had
on average around five years less experience and were approximately ten years younger. Finally,
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schools where students enrolled had higher teacher per student ratios at baseline. Therefore, ex-
cluding teacher characteristics, due to the introduction of the differentiated voucher, compliers
enrolled in higher quality voucher schools at baseline, in terms of peers and test scores, with re-
spect to the public schools they would have enrolled if the differentiated voucher had not been
introduced.
It is possible however, that even though compliers, students that changed their enrollment
decisions, enrolled in higher quality schools at baseline, the schools where they actually enrolled
were low quality voucher schools. This is analyzed in Table 1.9, that shows information on the
position at baseline of public schools where students would have enrolled and voucher schools
where students did enroll in the distribution of some characteristics relative to the other schools
of the same type in the municipality.
In the absence of the differentiated voucher, compliers would have enrolled in public schools
with large class sizes and enrollment with respect to other public schools in the market. Thanks
to the increase in school choice, they ended up enrolling in voucher schools with small class sizes
and enrollment with respect to voucher schools. These suggest that compliers may have stopped
enrolling in large public schools to enroll in small and undersubscribed voucher schools.
With regard to school quality at baseline, both counterfactual public schools and destination
voucher schools had test scores below the median for their type in the municipality. This means
that compliers enrolled less in low quality public schools to enroll more in low quality voucher
schools. However, even though the counterfactual public schools and destination voucher schools
were low quality with respect to other schools, compliers enrolled in voucher schools with higher
test scores at baseline with respect to counterfactual public schools, as discussed for Table 1.8.
Socioeconomic characteristics of counterfactual public schools and destination voucher schools
are not particularly different from socioeconomic characteristics of other public and voucher schools
in the market. But these schools do look different in terms of teacher education since both counter-
factual public schools and destination voucher schools, had a lower percentage of teachers with
a degree in education with respect to other schools of the same type. Finally, voucher schools
where compliers enrolled were “cheap” voucher schools, since they were in the bottom half of the
distribution of copays in the area.
In conclusion, the increase in school choice caused by the introduction of the differentiated
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voucher program reduced public school enrollment by around 1.6%. Students switching en-
rollment decisions enrolled in voucher schools with better socioeconomic characteristics and test
scores at baseline with respect to public schools where they would have enrolled in the absence
of the program. However, they decided not to enroll in low achieving public schools to enroll in
undersubscribed, low-copay, low achieving voucher schools.
1.7.2 School characteristics
The previous section discussed changes in enrollment decisions due to the increased school
choice caused by the differentiated voucher program, and changes in school characteristics at
baseline due to the decision to enroll in a voucher school instead of a public school. Since it is pos-
sible that voucher and public schools experience changes in their characteristics due to compliers
changing enrollment decisions, to the increased school resources or to increased competition, this
section looks at the current school characteristics that students encountered in the year they en-
rolled. Changes in school characteristics caused by enrollment responses of compliers, however,
are likely to be small, as only about 1.6 percent of students in the lowest groups of mother educa-
tion responded to the policy.
Unfortunately, the differentiated voucher program is likely to have caused a direct effect on
current school characteristics, violating the exclusion restriction. Therefore, it is not possible to
characterize counterfactual public schools and destination voucher schools using two stage least
squares, as in the previous section.
For this reason, this section analyzes changes in school characteristics on average for each of
the three groups of students by mother education, pooling together students enrolled in public
schools, students enrolled in voucher schools and students that switched enrollment in response
to the differentiated voucher.
However, given the enrollment patterns in each of the three groups (shown in table 1.6) and
since 90% of compliers belong to the group of students with mothers that completed high school
education, students with mothers with less than high school will generally remain in public
schools, students with mothers that completed high school include most compliers and students
in voucher and public schools, and students with mothers that completed university include stu-
dents that were usually already enrolled in voucher or elite private schools.
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Since the proportion of students that switched enrollment decisions was small, around 1.6%,
on average there were no significant changes in average socioeconomic index in schools where
students of each group enrolled in 1st grade, as shown in Figure 1.6 and Table 1.11. Public schools
where compliers would have enrolled in the absence of the program were barely affected, as were
voucher schools where compliers did actually enroll. Table 1.8 showed an improvement in so-
cioeconomic characteristics of schools at baseline for compliers, but since they are so few, these
effects are not visible on average, and are probably cancelled out with the very light decrease in
socioeconomic characteristics of voucher schools where they enrolled.
With regard to class size, Table 1.8 showed that compliers enrolled in voucher schools that had
on average class sizes that were about 5 students smaller at baseline. Again, since they were so
few, it is unlikely that they affected class sizes in voucher schools where they enrolled or in public
schools where they would have enrolled.
Figure 1.6 and Table 1.11 look at the average effects on current average class size for students
in each of the three groups of mother education. Average class size decreased, but insignificantly,
for students with mothers that had basic education. These students were primarily enrolled in
public schools, where class size fell somewhat, as discussed in the descriptive statistics, but not
significantly. Students with mothers that completed high school experienced significant decreases
in class size and found, on average, classes that were around half a student smaller. This fall
in class size is due to the enrollment by compliers in schools with smaller class sizes, together
with the very small decrease in class sizes for students in this group left behind in public schools.
Finally, students whose mother completed university education did not experience changes in
class size.
Another large difference in characteristics at baseline between counterfactual public schools
and voucher schools where compliers actually enrolled were teacher characteristics. Particularly,
teachers in voucher schools where compliers enrolled had, on average, five years less experience
than teachers in public schools where these students would have enrolled. Consistently, panel B
in figure 1.7 and row (C) in Table 1.12 show a significant decrease in teacher years of experience
for students with mothers that completed high school, the group that includes most compliers.
Unexpectedly, there is also a fall in teacher years of experience for students with uneducated
mothers, which is larger than for students with mothers that completed high school. This suggests
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that, additionally, there was a decrease in average teacher experience in public schools in 2008, as
was already visible in the summary statistics Table 1.2.
This seems related to a replacement of highly experienced teachers, teachers with, on average,
25 years of teaching experience, with less experienced teachers, that had, on average, 10 years of
teaching experience, particularly in public schools, as suggested by Figure 1.8 and Table 1.13, and
the summary statistics Table 1.2. Figure 1.8 and Table 1.13 illustrate increased hiring of teachers
in the first year of the program particularly in schools where most students with uneducated
mothers were enrolled. When considering the whole treatment period, this effect is significant
and largest for students with mothers that completed high school, since descriptive statistics in
Table 1.2 suggest increased hiring in 2009 and 2010 in voucher schools.
This is weak evidence that there were responses on the school side and that schools where
these students were enrolling responded to the increased competition or to the introduction of
achievement goals by restructuring their teaching teams.
To summarize, on average there were no changes in peer characteristics, but students with
mothers that completed high school had smaller class sizes and less experienced teachers. Stu-
dents with uneducated mothers also had a decrease in average teacher years of experience, which
seems related to responses to the differentiated voucher program on the school side, particularly
from public schools, and to a replacement of highly experienced teachers by less experienced
teachers.
1.7.3 Test scores
Figure 1.9 and Table 1.14 show the effect on average 4th grade test scores in a standardized
exam for students in each group of mother education. Test scores for students with uneducated
mothers that enrolled in 1st grade in 2008 and later, and took the standardized exam in 2011 or
later, increased significantly, by around 0.08 standard deviations. These students are the ones that
generally stayed in public schools and that had a decrease in average years of teaching experience
in their schools as a result of changes in teaching teams. This result suggests that students with
uneducated mothers could have benefited from the increased perceived competition by public
schools, and that the introduction of less experienced teachers could be a possible channel through
which public schools were responding.
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With regard to students with mothers that completed high school education, on average there
was a small negative effect on test scores caused by a decrease for the last post-policy cohort
included in the sample. However, this result is not robust and Figure 1.9 shows no significant
changes in test scores for the first two cohorts affected by the policy. These suggest that there were
no significant effects on average test scores for students with mothers that completed high school.
This group includes most students that switched enrollment decisions in response to the differenti-
ated voucher. These students enrolled in schools with better peer characteristics and achievement
at baseline, and lower class sizes, and younger and less experienced teachers. Nevertheless, they
decided not to enroll in low achievement public schools to enroll in low achievement voucher
schools. Consequently, the improvement in observable characteristics of schools may not have
been sufficient to increase test scores for these students. Additionally, as compliers were so few,
it is possible that their test scores increased or decreased somewhat but that these effects are not
large enough to be visible on average for the group of students with mothers that completed high
school education.
In the case of students in this group already enrolled in voucher schools, changes in school
characteristics were very small, given the proportion of compliers, so their test scores may have
stayed constant. Finally, regarding students in this group enrolled in public schools, even though
socioeconomic characteristics in these schools could not significantly change, they did experience
a change in teaching teams. Since their initial test scores were already higher than for students
with uneducated mothers, it is likely that changes in test scores were smaller. However, if we
believe that there may have been some positive effect on test scores for that group, that would
imply that there was some small decrease in test scores for compliers or for students that were
already enrolled in voucher schools, as summary statistics in Table 1.2 suggest. Nevertheless,
none of these possible effects on test scores is sufficiently large to lead to significant effects on test
scores, therefore, there were no observable effects on test scores for students with mothers that
completed high school education.
Finally, test scores for students with highly educated mothers did not change either. In this
case this is expected, since students in this group did not have any significant change in school
characteristics or in enrollment decisions.
In short, there were no obvious direct effects on test scores for students that took advantage of
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the increased school choice and enrolled in voucher schools instead of public schools. In contrast,
there were positive effects on test scores for the poorest students, those with uneducated mothers,
that could be related to the change in teaching teams in public schools that took place in 2008.
Therefore, on aggregate, the effects on test scores were positive but very small and insignificant,
and led by responses to the program by public schools instead of by re-sorting of students.
1.8 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
This section presents results that address possible concerns regarding the main specification
used in this paper.
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows results dividing the population of students according to the
tercile of the municipality socioeconomic index distribution they belong to instead of mother ed-
ucation. These results are comparable in terms of significance, sign and magnitude, to the results
using mother education level discussed throughout the paper, suggesting that the classification of
students does not affect the main conclusions of this paper.
As discussed in the Complier Characteristics section, there were delayed enrollment responses
to the differentiated voucher policy, caused mostly by the lack of information that families re-
ceived. For this reason, most of the tables presented pool together three pre-policy cohorts and two
post-policy cohorts. Table A.4 in the Appendix addresses possible concerns about biases caused
by the use of several cohorts by presenting results for the first post-policy cohort compared to
the last pre-policy cohort only. This table uses the first post-policy cohort as the only treated co-
hort and presents results comparing RD coefficients for the first post-policy cohort (students born
around the 2007 enrollment cutoff) to RD coefficients for the last pre-policy cohort (students born
around the 2006 enrollment cutoff). Results for this specification are very similar to the results of
the main specification, suggesting that the effects of the policy net of possible school responses are
comparable to the effects of the policy when considering delayed effects.
Tables A.5 and A.6 in the appendix deal with the fact that there are enrollment cutoffs in Chile
other that the main June 30 cutoff used in this paper. As discussed in the Empirical Strategy sec-
tion, the official enrollment cutoff was on March 31, with schools being able to set enrollment
cutoffs as late as June 30. As shown by McEwan and Shapiro (2008), the cutoff with a largest
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enrollment discontinuity was June 30, but there were other smaller enrollment discontinuities on
March 31, April 30 and May 31. Table A.5 presents the main results including only students that
were turning six years of age within 30 days of the June 30 enrollment cutoff, including only this
enrollment cutoff. Since this bandwidth reduces sample size to a third, there is a loss of signifi-
cance for most results. However, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to those
of the main results, suggesting that results are robust to using a smaller bandwidth. Alternatively,
the specification in Table A.6 allows the linear spline to change between each enrollment cutoff.
Results from this specification are, again, comparable to the main results. These two sets of results
suggest that the results obtained from the main specification are not affected by the inclusion of
other smaller enrollment cutoffs.
Finally, Table A.7 addresses the assumption that the confounders are constant over time and,
thus, the differences in RD get rid of them. This specification allows confounders to follow a linear
trend over time. Results show that fitting confounders in a liner trend instead of assuming that
they are constant over time does not affect the main results, as results in Table A.7 are comparable
in sign, magnitude and significance to the main results.
1.9 CONCLUSION
Even though the effects of school choice on educational outcomes have been broadly studied,
particularly for students enrolling in better schools, there is still limited evidence on the effects
of large-scale programs. Large-scale programs could affect the sorting of students, or induce re-
sponses on the school side to increases in competitive pressure, leading to different effects on
achievement for students switching enrollment, and affecting all students in the market. For that
very reason, it is generally difficult to measure the effects of large-scale school choice programs,
since there is no group of students unaffected by the program.
The literature has generally looked at aggregate effects of such programs (e.g., Hsieh and
Urquiola), or used structural estimation (e.g., Neilson, 2013) to determine the effects on educa-
tional outcomes. In this paper, I combine two sources of variation that allow me to identify: (1)
the proportion and characteristics of students switching enrollment decisions in response to an
increase in school choice caused by a large-scale program, (2) the characteristics at baseline of
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schools where students switching enrollment decisions enrolled and the characteristics of schools
where they would have enrolled in the absence of the policy and (3) changes in enrollment deci-
sions, current school characteristics and test scores for all students in the population, divided in
groups that were affected differently by the program.
My first result is that, despite the magnitude of the program, the impact on re-sorting of stu-
dents was small. Only a small fraction of students switched enrollment decisions. However, this
program was a reform to the existing voucher system in Chile, therefore, it is likely that most of
the re-sorting had already occurred before the policy.
Additionally, students that switched enrollment decisions were among the wealthiest eligi-
ble students, which is consistent with “cream-skimming” in the presence of selection by private
schools and with imperfect information, especially for the poorest families. Both seem to be the
case in Chile. Therefore, a small implication is that for such a policy to re-sort the poorest students,
information should be clear, with all population understanding the program and their eligibility
status, and non-selection by private schools should be enforced.
My second result shows that compliers, students switching enrollment decisions, enrolled in
schools that had better observable characteristics at baseline than schools where they would have
enrolled in the absence of the policy. Regarding current characteristics, schools where the group
of students that included most compliers enrolled had smaller class sizes and less experienced
teachers (in most cases with at least five years of teaching experience). Despite this improvement
in school characteristics, there are no effects on average test scores for the group of students with
most compliers. This result would be consistent with either small positive or negative effects on
average test scores for compliers, and is in line with the results of some literature on the effects of
attending a better school (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014). Additionally,
this result fits well with Neilson’s (2013) result that most of the effect on test scores of the differ-
entiated school voucher in Chile came through indirect channels, instead of through re-sorting of
students.
Finally, a third, perhaps surprising result is that test scores increased for the group of students
most likely to stay in public schools. This result could be due to an increase in competitive pres-
sure, as argued by Neilson (2013), and a subsequent increase in quality in public schools (e.g.,
Figlio and Hart, 2014). My analysis uncovers one potential channel through which public schools
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could be responding: there is an increase in hiring in public schools in the first year of the program
that resulted in lower average experience of teachers in public schools.
Further research is needed to understand what were the actual underlying mechanisms behind
the increase in test scores in public schools. Understanding the reasons why public schools suc-
ceeded in improving achievement is essential to design strategies to increase learning in all school
types.
Overall, the effect of the differentiated voucher program on test scores was positive, but small
and not significant. However, it did increase test scores for the poorest students in the population,
closing the test score gap. This policy increased public expenditure in education by 8%, close to
0.3% of Chile’s GDP. An open question is whether the same test score effects could have been
achieved through increased resources and monitoring of public schools, instead of an increase in
the school voucher, which would have reduced the cost of the policy.
Even though the particular effects of the program may be specific to Chile, there is a conclusion
that can be generalized. Public schools seem to have responded to the increase in potential com-
petition. Consequently, the differentiated voucher program was successful in increasing achieve-
ment in public schools, despite the small effects on re-sorting of students. Therefore, education
policies may have effects beyond those for targeted students. These general equilibrium effects
need to be taken into account when designing policies.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Changes in school choice: Proportion of voucher schools that are free for eligible stu-
dents
Table 1.1: Sample summary statistics by enrollment year
School year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total students in 1st grade 260,724 251,602 256,040 248,921 247,575 241,203
Enrolled in public schools 0.488 0.468 0.450 0.430 0.416 0.397
Enrolled in voucher schools 0.447 0.465 0.482 0.499 0.513 0.528
Average 4th grade standardized score 0.005 0.062 0.145 0.167 0.206 0.175
Total number of schools 8,771 8,697 8,680 8,685 8,665 8,598
Proportion of public schools 0.606 0.596 0.589 0.583 0.576 0.570
Proportion of voucher schools 0.343 0.355 0.362 0.368 0.374 0.381
Proportion of voucher participating schools 0 0 0 0.483 0.581 0.612
Notes: The chart above lists the descriptive statistics for the sample of students enrolling in first grade in each year. Test
scores are comparable over time and normalized with respect to test scores in 2005.
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Table 1.2: School summary statistics by enrollment year
School year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Panel A: Public schools
Number of students in class (1st) 30.5 30.0 30.0 29.3 28.8 28.0
Number of teachers per student 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.049 0.052
Number of students in school (1st-4th) 271.4 238.7 223.5 220.2 208.4 201.6
Average school socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) -44.2 -43.3 -45.3 -48.2 -47.6 -51.2
Proportion of mothers with university ed. (1st) 0.028 0.031 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.038
Proportion of mothers with basic ed. or less (1st) 0.345 0.332 0.341 0.355 0.345 0.321
Teachers with a degree in education (%) 95.6 96.1 96.0 96.8 97.1 97.6
Teaching experience in years 22.9 23.4 23.9 21.8 20.8 20.7
Teacher age 49.2 49.3 49.7 48.1 47.5 47.4
Proportion of teachers hired on year 0.087 0.097 0.080 0.145 0.147 0.133
Proportion of teachers terminated on previous year 0.076 0.104 0.081 0.170 0.130 0.126
Average teacher evaluation scores 2.556 2.581 2.598 2.648 2.621 2.592
Male teachers 0.265 0.265 0.261 0.268 0.268 0.27
Per student expenditure of extra voucher funds (1st) 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.9 222.1 407.6
Standardized 4th grade average scores -0.251 -0.189 -0.091 -0.054 -0.016 -0.055
Panel B: Voucher schools
Number of students in class (1st) 34.4 34.3 34.8 34.6 34.3 34.2
Number of teachers per student 0.04 0.04 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.043
Number of students in school (1st-4th) 323.5 285.9 272.2 272.7 257.7 274.9
Average school socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) 16.4 17.4 16.0 11.5 11.0 6.8
Proportion of mothers with university ed. (1st) 0.091 0.095 0.101 0.118 0.118 0.125
Proportion of mothers with basic ed. or less (1st) 0.146 0.139 0.143 0.154 0.152 0.138
Teachers with a degree in education (%) 90.8 92.2 91.7 94.2 95.3 96.2
Teaching experience in years 13.4 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.3 13.2
Teacher age 41.6 41.4 41.2 41.2 41.0 40.7
Proportion of teachers hired on year 0.162 0.174 0.176 0.177 0.191 0.196
Proportion of teachers terminated on previous year 0.101 0.126 0.131 0.139 0.140 0.144
Male teachers 0.253 0.248 0.246 0.242 0.241 0.239
Per student expenditure of extra voucher funds (1st) 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.0 180.5 300.2
Standardized 4th grade average scores 0.137 0.185 0.251 0.234 0.269 0.223
Panel C: Elite private schools
Number of students in class (1st) 26.1 26.2 26.4 26.4 26.0 26.2
Number of teachers per student 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.07 0.07
Number of students in school (1st-4th) 283.5 253.0 242.9 260.1 232.9 253.0
Average school socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) 202.0 201.3 197.9 191.3 191.1 181.5
Proportion of mothers with university ed. (1st) 0.507 0.45 0.493 0.625 0.645 0.666
Proportion of mothers with basic ed. or less (1st) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005
Teachers with a degree in education (%) 94.7 94.7 94.7 95.2 95.9 96.2
Teaching experience in years 14.1 14.6 14.7 14.8 15.0 15.1
Teacher age 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.1 42.2 42.1
Proportion of teachers hired on year 0.177 0.138 0.134 0.137 0.133 0.128
Proportion of teachers terminated on previous year 0.120 0.115 0.121 0.120 0.116 0.101
Male teachers 0.226 0.223 0.217 0.228 0.228 0.225
Per student expenditure of extra voucher funds (1st) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standardized 4th grade average scores 0.951 0.945 0.925 0.891 0.903 0.852
Notes: The chart above lists the descriptive statistics of average school characteristics for each school type and year.
Average test scores are shown by enrollment year in 1st grade. They are comparable over time and normalized with
respect to test scores in 2005.
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Figure 1.2: Probability of enrolling in the next academic year by distance from the date of birth to
the June 30th enrollment cutoff
Notes: Each circle above represents the proportion of students that turned six years of age on that day and enrolled in
2008 instead of 2007 within 90 days of the June 30, 2007 enrollment cutoff.
Figure 1.3: Changes in school choice: Slow distribution of information
Notes: This graph represents the proportion of students that enrolled in voucher schools instead of public schools
in response to the introduction of the differentiated voucher. Each observation represents the RD coefficient of the
probability of enrolling in a voucher school for students born after the enrollment cutoff using a window of 90 days
around the enrollment cutoff and including a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.
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(A) Voucher schools 0.0143***
(0.0052)
(B) Public schools -0.0146***
(0.0052)
(C) Elite private schools 0.0004
(0.0027)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a
window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows
the differences in the RD coefficients for the post-policy period (2008-2010) with respect to the pre-policy period
(2005-2007) including a full set of cohort dummies.





Mother has basic education or less 0.145 0.22
(0.228) [0.41]
Mother has high school education 0.889 0.65
(0.295) [0.48]
Mother has university education 0.047 0.13
(0.211) [0.34]
Average socioeconomic index -46.82 0.27
(65.49) [99.8]
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the standard deviations are in
brackets. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. Enrollment in voucher school is instrumented with the
interaction of the dummy of turning six after the enrollment cutoff and the indicator for belonging to the treated
cohorts. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows the complier characteristics including all years in the sample and a full set of
cohort dummies. Column (2) shows the proportion of students in each category in the population for the post-policy
years (2008-2010).
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Table 1.5: Proportion of students by mother’s education and year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mothers with basic education or less 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.19
Mothers with high school education 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66
Mothers with university education or more 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14
Average years of mother education 11.30 11.50 11.55 11.59 11.55 11.89
Number of observations 260,724 251,602 256,040 248,921 247,575 241,203
Notes: Includes students in 1st grade.
Table 1.6: Enrollment patterns by mother’s education and year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Panel A: Mothers with basic education or less
Public schools 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.64
Voucher schools 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.36
Elite private schools 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Mothers with high school education
Public schools 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.36
Voucher schools 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.60
Elite private schools 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Panel C: Mothers with university education
Public schools 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12
Voucher schools 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.52
Elite private schools 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36
Notes: Includes students in 1st grade.
Figure 1.4: School choices: cohort RD coefficients - RD coefficient for 2006/07
Notes: Each observation represents the difference in the RD coefficient with respect to the RD coefficient for the
last pre-policy cohort (2006/07) together with its 95% confidence interval using a window of 90 days around the
enrollment cutoff and including a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Each RD coefficient can
be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the outcome for students born after the enrollment cutoff.
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Table 1.7: School choices: Probability of enrollment in public schools by mother education level
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-policy Post-policy Post-Pre
(A) All students -0.0123*** -0.0270*** -0.0146***
(0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0052)
(B) Mother with basic education or less 0.0018 -0.0137* -0.0160
(0.0086) (0.0078) (0.0116)
(C) Mother with high school education -0.0118** -0.0271*** -0.0156**
(0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0072)
(D) Mother with university education -0.0107 -0.0133* -0.0025
(0.0093) (0.0068) (0.0115)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff
for years 2005 and 2006, while column (2) for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD
coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1) including a full set of cohort dummies.
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Class size 34.50 29.55 -4.95
(4.20) (3.90)
Total enrollment 337.1 106.6 -230.5
(75.26) (123.8)
Standardized 4th grade average score -0.427 -0.006 0.421
(0.164) (0.201)
Socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) -33.25 34.06 67.31
(15.70) (24.90)
Proportion of mothers with basic or less 0.298 0.099 -0.199
(0.084) (0.079)
Proportion of mothers with university 0.025 0.157 0.132
(0.018) (0.051)
Teachers with education degree (%) 97.81 88.67 -9.14
(2.60) (4.18)
Average teacher experience in years 16.83 6.84 -9.99
(1.05) (1.78)
Average teacher age 46.22 35.96 -10.26
(2.31) (1.87)
Average teacher per student 0.031 0.062 0.031
(0.009) (0.011)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. Enrollment in
voucher and public school are instrumented with the interaction of the dummy of turning six after the enrollment
cutoff and the indicator for belonging to the treated cohorts. The regressions above use a window of 90 days, include
all years and a full set of cohort dummies. They also include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment
cutoff.
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Table 1.9: School characteristics at baseline for compliers with respect to schools of the same type
in the municipality
(1) (2)
Counterfactual public Destination voucher
schools schools
(A) Class size
Below the median 0.372 0.811
(0.209) (0.217)
Above the median 0.628 0.189
(0.209) (0.217)
(B) Total enrollment
Below the median 0.317 0.751
(0.214) (0.214)
Above the median 0.683 0.249
(0.214) (0.214)
(C) Standardized 4th grade average score
Below the median 0.723 0.806
(0.200) (0.213)
Above the median 0.277 0.194
(0.200) (0.213)
(D) Socioeconomic index (%)
Below the median 0.554 0.565
(0.197) (0.203)
Above the median 0.446 0.435
(0.197) (0.203)
(E) Proportion of mothers with basic or less
Below the median 0.465 0.606
(0.201) (0.206)
Above the median 0.535 0.394
(0.201) (0.206)
(F) Proportion of mothers with university
Below the median 0.614 0.589
(0.198) (0.205)
Above the median 0.386 0.411
(0.198) (0.205)
(G) Teachers with education degree (%)
Below the median 0.923 1.060
(0.176) (0.227)
Above the median 0.077 -0.060
(0.176) (0.227)
(H) Copay amount
Below the median - 0.858
- (0.213)
Above the median - 0.142
- (0.213)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. Enrollment in
voucher and public school are instrumented with the interaction of the dummy of turning six after the enrollment
cutoff and the indicator for belonging to the treated cohorts.The regressions above use a window of 90 days, include all
years and a full set of cohort dummies. They also include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.
41
Figure 1.5: Peer characteristics: cohort RD coefficients - RD coefficient for 2006/07
Notes: Each observation represents the difference in the RD coefficient with respect to the RD coefficient for the
last pre-policy cohort (2006/07) together with its 95% confidence interval using a window of 90 days around the
enrollment cutoff and including a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Each RD coefficient can
be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the outcome for students born after the enrollment cutoff.
Table 1.10: School characteristics: Average socioeconomic index in 1st grade (normalized nation-
ally within grade - mean 0, standard deviation 100)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-policy Post-policy Post-Pre
(A) All students 4.479*** 4.380*** -0.097
(0.639) (0.520) (0.824)
(B) Mother with basic education or less 1.097 1.040 -0.070
(0.782) (0.697) (1.047)
(C) Mother with high school education 3.682*** 3.076*** -0.587
(0.739) (0.574) (0.936)
(D) Mother with university education 7.191*** 6.555*** -0.626
(2.385) (1.748) (2.957)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff
for years 2005 and 2006, while column (2) for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD
coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1) including a full set of cohort dummies.
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Figure 1.6: School characteristics: cohort RD coefficients - RD coefficient for 2006/07
Notes: Each observation represents the difference in the RD coefficient with respect to the RD coefficient for the
last pre-policy cohort (2006/07) together with its 95% confidence interval using a window of 90 days around the
enrollment cutoff and including a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Each RD coefficient can
be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the outcome for students born after the enrollment cutoff.
Table 1.11: School characteristics: Number of students in the class by mother education level
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-policy Post-policy Post-Pre
(A) All students 0.471*** 0.137** -0.332***
(0.083) (0.068) (0.107)
(B) Mother with basic education or less 0.472** 0.321* -0.154
(0.219) (0.193) (0.292)
(C) Mother with high school education 0.493*** -0.0317 -0.515***
(0.105) (0.086) (0.136)
(D) Mother with university education 0.231 0.321* 0.091
(0.235) (0.179) (0.295)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff
for years 2005 and 2006, while column (2) for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD
coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1) including a full set of cohort dummies.
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Figure 1.7: School characteristics: cohort RD coefficients - RD coefficient for 2006/07
Notes: Each observation represents the difference in the RD coefficient with respect to the RD coefficient for the
last pre-policy cohort (2006/07) together with its 95% confidence interval using a window of 90 days around the
enrollment cutoff and including a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Each RD coefficient can
be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the outcome for students born after the enrollment cutoff.
Table 1.12: School characteristics: Average teacher experience in years in the school by mother
education level
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-policy Post-policy Post-Pre
(A) All students 0.0726 -0.343*** -0.411***
(0.058) (0.044) (0.073)
(B) Mother with basic education or less 0.117 -0.468*** -0.590***
(0.134) (0.113) (0.175)
(C) Mother with high school education 0.143* -0.361*** -0.494***
(0.081) (0.060) (0.101)
(D) Mother with university education 0.058 0.068 0.010
(0.158) (0.112) (0.194)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff
for years 2005 and 2006, while column (2) for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD
coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1) including a full set of cohort dummies.
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Figure 1.8: School characteristics: cohort RD coefficients - RD coefficient for 2006/07
Notes: Each observation represents the difference in the RD coefficient with respect to the RD coefficient for the
last pre-policy cohort (2006/07) together with its 95% confidence interval using a window of 90 days around the
enrollment cutoff and including a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Each RD coefficient can
be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the outcome for students born after the enrollment cutoff.
Table 1.13: School characteristics: Proportion of teachers hired in the current year
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-policy Post-policy Post-Pre
(A) All students 0.0011 0.0034*** 0.0023*
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0014)
(B) Mother with basic education or less 0.0024 0.0075*** 0.0051
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0034)
(C) Mother with high school education 0.0015 0.0040*** 0.0025
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0019)
(D) Mother with university education 0.0043 -0.0033 -0.0076*
(0.0034) (0.0026) (0.0042)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff
for years 2005 and 2006, while column (2) for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD
coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1) including a full set of cohort dummies.
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Figure 1.9: Test scores: cohort RD coefficients - RD coefficient for 2006/07
Notes: Each observation represents the difference in the RD coefficient with respect to the RD coefficient for the
last pre-policy cohort (2006/07) together with its 95% confidence interval using a window of 90 days around the
enrollment cutoff and including a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Each RD coefficient can
be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the outcome for students born after the enrollment cutoff.
Table 1.14: Test scores: Average Math and Spanish standardized 4th grade test scores
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-policy Post-policy Post-Pre
(A) All students 0.199*** 0.201*** 0.003
(0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
(B) Mother with basic education or less 0.147*** 0.228*** 0.084***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025)
(C) Mother with high school education 0.233*** 0.205*** -0.024*
(0.012) (0.009) (0.014)
(D) Mother with university education 0.100*** 0.117*** 0.017
(0.026) (0.017) (0.031)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff
for years 2005 and 2006, while column (2) for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD
coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1) including a full set of cohort dummies.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Distributing School
Performance Information: Evidence from
the Chilean “Traffic Lights”
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, there has been an increase in the use of student performance measures to
evaluate education systems and, especially, individual school effectiveness. Most research shows
a positive impact of school accountability1 on student achievement (e.g., Rockoff and Turner, 2010;
Figlio and Rouse, 2006) as schools respond to the (explicit or implicit) rewards and/or sanctions
of accountability systems. For instance, if school quality information is made public, parents can
reward or sanction schools through their enrollment choices (e.g., Hastings and Weinstein, 2008).
Enrollment responses, however, can also directly affect future school evaluations if they lead to
non-random sorting of students across schools. For this reason, it is important to understand
parents’ enrollment responses to school accountability in order to correctly interpret changes in
school performance.
In this paper I analyze the effects on enrollment choices and student achievement of the dis-
tribution of simplified school performance information in Chile in 2010 for students in different
points of the socioeconomic distribution. Specifically, the policy provided all families in Chile with
a map that included all schools in their municipality color-coded in three categories depending on
the previous’ year school performance in a national standardized test.
I use administrative information for all the students that enroll in 1st grade and match this
information to standardized test scores for 4th grade and individual socioeconomic information.
To carry out this analysis, I use two sources of variation. First, I exploit the timing of the policy:
information was distributed in 2010 and could affect 2011 enrollment choices. Second, I use the
fact that Chile, like many countries, has an enrollment cutoff – children that turn six years of
age after June 30th must wait one year to enroll in 1st grade by law. Taken together, these facts
imply that students at either side of the enrollment cutoff potentially had different levels of school
performance information when they chose a school in 1st grade.
This difference in the exposure to the school performance information around the enrollment
cutoff allows me to compare student enrollment choices and test scores in a regression discontinu-
ity (RD) design. Additionally, by using the RD created by the enrollment cutoff for years prior to
1School accountability refers to the evaluation of schools using student performance measures.
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the distribution of information, I can identify possible trends and confounders that could be bias-
ing the RD estimates. Finally, taking differences of the RD estimates, I obtain unbiased estimates
of the impact of distributing school performance information. Further, this identification strategy
allows me to identify effects within groups of students at different points of the socioeconomic
distribution, which makes it possible to decompose the aggregate effects of the policy on student
responses and outcomes.
Since I find stronger effects in larger school markets, I focus the analysis on the largest school
market in Chile: Santiago’s metropolitan area. There, I perform three different exercises. First I
characterize compliers – students that respond to the school performance information by switch-
ing enrollment choices. Second, I look at changes in enrollment choices for students at different
points of the socioeconomic distribution, and compare the characteristics at baseline of schools
where compliers enroll to schools where they would have enrolled in absence of the policy. Fi-
nally, I analyze the effects of the increased school choice on current school characteristics and test
scores.
To characterize compliers, I instrument enrollment in high-performing schools with the inter-
action of the timing of the policy and whether a student was born after the enrollment cutoff. I
find that, in response to the new information, less students enrolled in average-performing schools
and more students enrolled in high-performing schools (as defined by their absolute scores). There
were no changes in enrollment in low-performing schools.
In the second stage, I obtain the average characteristics of compliers. I find that most students
responding to the policy belong to the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribu-
tion and only around 35% of compliers belong to the bottom half of the municipality socioeco-
nomic distribution. Since the school information included elite private schools and expensive and
selective subsidized private schools, these schools were overrepresented in the high-performing
category of schools. Thus, students in the bottom half of the socioeconomic distribution were less
able to respond to the information by switching enrollment to high-performing schools. In con-
trast, most students in the top quartile of the socioeconomic distribution were already enrolled in
high-performing schools. For this reason, there are no compliers that belong to the fourth quartile.
Then, using differences in RD estimates I examine the impact on enrollment decisions. Consis-
tent with the results of the complier characterization I find a decrease in enrollment in average-
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performing schools and an increase in enrollment in high-performing schools, particularly for
students in the top half of the municipality socioeconomic distribution and in the third quartile.
I instrument enrollment in average-performing and high-performing schools in a two-stage
least squares system and find that, in response to the distribution of information, compliers enroll
less in public schools and more in subsidized and elite private schools and switch enrollment
towards schools with a better socioeconomic composition at baseline.
The analysis of current school characteristics shows that students in the group that contains
most compliers, the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution, end up in schools
that have a better socioeconomic composition and with higher segregation levels, while there are
no significant changes in teacher or other school characteristics.
Finally, the differences in RD show no significant changes in Math standardized test scores
but suggest a significant and relatively large increase in Spanish standardized test scores for the
whole student population in Santiago and particularly for students in the third quartile of the
municipality socioeconomic distribution.2 This result, however, loses significance and magnitude
when I include the whole student population in Chile. It is possible that some school market
particularities in Santiago, such as, for example, a larger level of school choice, are the trigger
behind this effect.
The overall increase in Spanish test scores in Santiago suggests that a low-cost policy, such as
distributing simplified school performance information, could have real effects on achievement
by sorting students to better-performing schools. However, this increase was particularly strong
for students in the top half of the socioeconomic distribution, while scores for students in the
bottom half did not significantly change. This suggests that this policy could have also induced
a decrease in education equity by improving education opportunities for higher-income students
while keeping those of lower-income students constant.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on school
accountability by analyzing student sorting responses to the availability of school performance
information. School accountability has been shown to have a positive impact on student achieve-
ment (e.g., Rockoff and Turner, 2010; Figlio and Rouse, 2006), to trigger gaming behaviors by
2These results are consistent with Zimmerman (2003) that shows how peers’ verbal scores are more strongly linked
to student achievement than math peers’ scores.
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schools and teachers (e.g., Figlio and Getzler, 2006; Figlio, 2006; Jacob, 2005), to affect housing
prices (Black, 1999; Figlio and Lucas, 2004), to affect parents’ contributions to schools (Figlio and
Kenny, 2009) and to modify school practices (Goldhaber et al, 2013). In this paper I show that
disclosing school performance information can, additionally, induce enrollment responses and in-
crease sorting of students across schools with, in this case, higher-income students enrolling in
higher-perfomance schools.
Second, this paper adds to the literature on responses to school performance information. Lit-
erature on parents’ responses to school quality information shows mixed results (e.g., Hastings
and Weinstein, 2008; Andrabi, Das and Kwaja, 2015; Mizala and Urquiola, 2010) as enrollment
responses are affected by how the information is presented and distributed, and by the school’s
ability to select students.3 For instance, the ability of parents to respond to school performance
information will depend on the set of schools included (e.g., only schools in the choice set or all
schools), the way information is presented (e.g., adjusted by socioeconomic composition or not,
by categories of achievement or the full rank of schools) and on how the information is distributed
(e.g., parents receive reports cards or information has to be accessed online). Low-income families
may not be able to respond to information that simply states that elite private schools are the top-
performing schools in their area. This paper adds to this literature by identifying the effects of the
distribution of simplified school performance information when this information is not adjusted
by school socioeconomic composition and schools out of students’ school choice sets are included.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on aggregate effects of education policies (e.g., Hsieh
and Urquiola, 2006; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015). My identification strategy allows me
to characterize students responding to the distribution of school performance information, under-
stand how their enrollment choices change, and analyze changes in current school characteristics
and test scores for all students in the population, including students that are not responding to
the policy but could be affected by students changing enrollment decisions. Thus, I can decom-
3Hastings and Weinstein (2008) analyzed policies that provided low and middle-income parents with test score
information for public schools (only) in their transportation zone. They found switching in enrollment towards higher-
performing schools. Andrabi, Das and Kwaja (2015) provided parents of children enrolled in school with report cards
that included test score rank information for all schools in the village, including public and private schools, their
results suggest some switching of students out of low-scoring private schools. Mizala and Urquiola (2010) looked at
the effects on enrollment choices for public and private subsidized schools of being categorized as a top-performing
school with respect to schools with similar socioeconomic composition. These results are largely disseminated in the
media, however, they found no effects on enrollment switching.
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pose the effects of the policy by looking at the effects on students that were differently affected
by the distribution of information, that means, students that responded, and students that did not
respond but may have faced changes in school characteristics due to the policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the following section describes the Chilean
school system and the distribution of school quality information. Section 3 discusses the data used
in this paper and presents descriptive statistics, then, section 4 describes my empirical strategy
and the differences in RD design, followed by section 5 that presents my results and section 6 that
discusses some robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes this paper.
2.2 BACKGROUND
Chile introduced universal school choice, through school vouchers, in 1981. This education
reform defined three types of schools based on the financing of the school:
1. Public (or municipal) schools. These schools are controlled by the municipalities and funded
centrally through a per-student payment for every child attending their schools. Public
schools can only legally turn away students if they are oversubscribed.
2. Voucher (private) schools. These schools are privately controlled and up to 1993 were funded
exclusively through the same per-student payment as public schools. Since 1993 these schools
can charge supplementary tuition.4 If they choose to do so, the per-student payment is pro-
gressively reduced as tuition increases, but this reduction does not offset the tuition revenues
except for very high tuition levels. In contrast to public schools, voucher schools were al-
lowed to select students up to 2009.5
3. Elite private schools. These private institutions do not receive public funding and are financed
through tuition fees. They account for around 7% of total enrollment and serve mainly
high-income households.
In 2010, Sebastián Piñera’s Government built on the education market’s mechanisms by dis-
tributing simplified school performance information. In July 2010, all families in Chile received a
4Law 19.247 of September 15, 1993.
5Article 12 in Law 20.370 of September 12, 2009. Carrasco et al. (2014) suggest that voucher schools continue to
select students.
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map of their municipality which included all schools (including voucher and elite private schools)
color-coded as a traffic light depending on their performance in a national standardized test in
2009.
Specifically, schools with a score lower than the national average of the test were colored in
red in the map, schools with scores around the average of the test were colored in yellow, and
schools with scores higher than the average of the test were colored in green. Families received
this information for schools in their own municipality, and all schools were included, regardless
of whether they were selective or their tuition fee amount. Additionally, schools’ test scores were
not adjusted by the socioeconomic composition of schools.
Through the distribution of this information the government intended to increase families’ re-
sponsiveness to school performance measures and increase schools’ pressure to improve quality.
However, the policy was not well-received by education experts and many claimed that the maps
were simply a picture of inequality in Chile. Since test scores were not adjusted by socioeconomic
composition,6 many families, and specially those in lower-income neighborhoods, would not be
able to respond to the information by enrolling their children in a higher-performing school, there-
fore, experts argued that the only outcome of the policy would be to stigmatize schools.7
This policy was first announced during President Piñera’s speech on May 21st 2010, and the
distribution of information started on June 4th. By July 23rd 85% of schools had delivered the in-
formation,8 which included the school performance municipality map together with letters from
the President, Sebastián Piñera, and the Minister of Education, Joaquín Lavín, and advice to par-
ents to improve their children’s education.9 Since the school year starts in March, the school per-
formance information could have affected school enrollment decisions in 2011. This policy was
discontinued in later years due to the pressure of the media and education experts.
6Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola (2007) show that school rankings based on test score information in Chile are
very similar to school rankings based solely on students’ socioeconomic status.
7See for example Jaime Retamal , “Como política pública es una medida muy simplista,”
El Mostrador, July 19, 2010, http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2010/07/19/%E2%80%
9Ccomo-politica-publica-es-una-medida-muy-simplista%E2%80%9D/ (accessed May 2, 2016); or Alejandra Mizala,
“El Simce, una vez más,” La Segunda, June 10, 2010.
8United Press International, “Mineduc fiscalizará en colegios la entrega de mapas Simce”, La Tercera, July 23 2010,
http://www.latercera.com/contenido/679_278698_9.shtml (accessed May 2, 2016).
9For more information, see Allende (2011).
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2.3 DATA
This chapter uses the same data that Chapter 1, please, refer to Chapter 1 Section 1.4 for more
detail.
To carry out the analysis I use the sample of students enrolling in 1st grade in 2009, 2010 and
2011. I focus on enrollment in 1st grade since there are no costs of switching the initial enrollment
decision.10
2.3.1 School Classification
As part of the policy, schools were classified in three categories depending on their performance
on a standardized test in 2009. Unfortunately, there is no information regarding the actual classifi-
cation of schools or the detailed procedure used to classify schools. Thus, I use 2009 standardized
test scores for 4th grade and allocate schools to categories as follows:11
• Low-performing (red) schools are those with an average standardized 4th grade score in 2009
more than one standard deviation lower than the 4th grade standardized average score in
Chile for 2009.
• Average-performing (yellow) schools are those with an average standardized 4th grade score in
2009 less than one standard deviation away from the 4th grade standardized average score
in Chile for 2009.
• High-performing (green) schools are those with average standardized 4th grade score in 2009
more than one standard deviation higher than the 4th grade standardized average score in
Chile for 2009.
Table 2.1 presents school characteristics at baseline for schools in each one of the categories in
Santiago.12 The largest category of schools is the one for schools within one standard deviation of
10In omitted results I found no effects on transfers for students in higher grades. Enrollment in later grades responds
less to new information due to the existence of costs related to switching schools.
11Results are robust to alternative categorizations of schools, as shown in Table B.6 in the Appendix for Allende’s
(2011) definition.
12Heterogeneity results show stronger responses to the policy in larger school markets. Therefore, as discussed in
Section 2.5.1 in this chapter, this analysis focuses on the largest school market in Chile, Santiago metropolitan area, to
determine the effects of the distribution of school performance information.
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the average score (average-performing schools), and the smallest group is the one corresponding
to low-performing schools.
There is a high correlation between the type of school and its classification by performance.
Public schools are overrepresented in low-performing schools, voucher schools in average-performing
schools, and elite private schools in high-performing schools. Similarly, average voucher school
copay and school selectivity increase with school performance.
Regarding socioeconomic composition of schools, as Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola (2007)
showed, there is a high correlation between school performance and socioeconomic composition.
Higher performing schools have higher-income students with higher-educated mothers. Students
eligible for other targeted social programs are mostly enrolled in low-performing schools.
Class size increases from low-performing to average-performing schools, and decreases from
average-performing to high-performing schools. This is consistent with Urquiola and Verhoogen
(2009) who show an inverted-U relationship between class size and household income. As they
discuss, lower-quality schools struggle to fill their classrooms, while higher-quality schools reduce
class sizes to appeal to richer families.
The ratio of teachers per student is consistent with average class sizes, with a significantly
larger ratio of teacher per student in high-performing schools. Teacher experience and age do not
vary much between the three categories of schools, although, on average, teachers are younger
and slightly less experienced in high-performing schools. Finally, the average level of education
for teachers in the three types of schools is fairly similar, with a slight increase in the percentage
of educated teachers for high-performing schools.
2.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The empirical strategy used in this chapter is methodologically equivalent to the one used in
Chapter 1. Please, refer to Chapter 1 Section 1.5 for more detail.
I use two sources of variation to analyze the effects of the distribution of school performance
information on enrollment decisions, school characteristics and achievement: the timing of the
policy and exogenous variation on students’ 1st grade enrollment year caused by an enrollment
cutoff.
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The policy of interest was carried out in June 2010, which implies that could have affected
enrollment choices for the first time for students who enrolled in 2011.13 Thus, the cohort of
students that enrolled in 2010/2011 is the “treated” cohort.
The second source of variation originates in Chile’s enrollment cutoff. As discussed in Chapter
1, in Chile all students that turn six years of age after June 30th have to wait until the next year to
enroll in 1st grade by law. This creates a discontinuity in the exposure to the school performance
information at the time of school choice. Figure 2.1 illustrates the discontinuity in the probability
of enrolling in 2011 (instead of 2010) for students born after the enrollment cutoff. Since other
enrollment cutoffs exist, the probability of enrolling in 2011 was already increasing for students
born before the June 30th enrollment cutoff, but the June 30th cutoff is the largest discontinuity in
the probability of enrolling in 2011.
I will use the discontinuity in the probability of enrolling in 2011, caused by the enrollment
cutoff, in a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design to identify the effects of the distribution of school
performance information on enrollment choices, school characteristics and test scores.
It is possible that there existed enrollment pre-trends or, in the case of test scores, that there were
“enrollment age” or “age-at-test” effects (McEwan and Shapiro, 2008). Thus, I use the disconti-
nuity created by the enrollment cutoff for the year prior to the policy to estimate these possible
confounders. Then, I take differences in RD coefficients to estimate the effects of the distribution
of school performance information.14
The differences in RD estimate can be obtained by interacting a “treated” term in an RD regres-
sion, as follows:
yi = β + θPosti + ρTreatedi + αPosti × Treatedi + f (Bi) + ui (2.1)
13The school year in Chile starts in March and admissions start in September of the previous year.
14Table B.2 in the appendix shows that there are no significant differences in socioeconomic characteristics of stu-
dents born at either side of the cutoff. However, Table B.3 shows that density of births is not stable around the cutoff.
Seasonality in births could explain changes in density of births. This policy was discussed for the first time in May
2010, therefore, since students that turned six around the 2010/2011 enrollment cutoff were conceived in 2003, it is
impossible that there was manipulation of day of birth in response to the school performance information policy. Since
the socioeconomic characteristics of students at either side of the cutoff are similar and changes in the density of births
cannot be related to the policy, due to the timing of the policy, this fall in birth densities should not cause any bias to
the differences in RD estimates.
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where yi is the outcome of interest, Posti is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the student
was born after the enrollment cutoff, Treatedi is an indicator equal to one if the student belongs
to the cohort born around the 2010 enrollment cutoff (and that enrolled in 2010/2011), B is the
distance from the sixth birthday to the June 30th enrollment cutoff, and f (Bi) is a flexible paramet-
ric specification that includes higher-order polynomials of sixth birthday and can vary on either
side of the enrollment cutoff. My main specification uses a linear spline on sixth birthday distance
to cutoff interacted with a dummy indicating whether the student falls to the left or the right of
the cutoff and with whether the student belongs to the “treated” cohort. I focus my analysis on a
90-day window around the June 30th cutoff, with day 0 representing the last cohort “untreated”.
The coefficient α in regression (2.1) represents the estimate of the intent-to-treat effect of the
distribution of school performance information.
2.5 RESULTS
This section presents five sets of results. First of all, it shows heterogeneity in responses to
the distribution of school performance information by school market characteristics. Since school
market size is highly correlated with responses to the policy, I focus my analisys on Chile’s largest
school market: Santiago’s metropolitan area. Second, it looks at the characteristics of students
switching enrollment decisions in response to the distribution of school performance information.
The third set of results illustrates responses in 1st grade enrollment to the policy for different stu-
dent types, and compares the average characteristics of schools where compliers enroll in response
to the policy to characteristics of schools where compliers would have enrolled in absence of the
policy at baseline. Then, the fourth set of results presents results on the current school character-
istics that students encounter after the resorting of students caused by the policy. Finally, the fifth
set of results shows the effects on 4th grade standardized test scores for students that enrolled after
school performance information was distributed.
Results for most outcomes are presented in a table that follows always the same structure.
Column (1) presents estimates of the possible confounders, that is, the RD coefficient for the last
pre-policy cohort (students born within 90 days of the 2009 enrollment cutoff and that enrolled in
2009 and 2010). Column (2) shows RD estimates for the treated cohort, students born within 90
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days of the 2010 enrollment cutoff and that enrolled in 2010 and 2011. Finally, column (3) shows
the differences in the RD estimates for column (2) minus column (1), that is, the unbiased estimate
of the effect of distributing school performance information on the outcome.
Since, as shown in Figure 2.1, the probability of waiting one year to enroll increases by less
than 1 for students born after the enrollment cutoff, the RD estimates in this case are intent-to-
treat (ITT) estimates. This probability, that would correspond to the first stage in a fuzzy RD
design, increases by 0.4 for students born after the enrollment cutoff. Thus, the average treatment
on the treated effects (ATT) would be roughly equal to the presented estimates multiplied by one
over 0.4, this means by 2.5.
2.5.1 Heterogeneity
Since the policy of interest consisted on the distribution of information, it is likely that re-
sponses to the policy varied depending on the characteristics of the school market. For this reason,
Table 2.2 looks at the effect of the policy on the probability of enrolling in high-performing schools
(green) for the full sample (column (1)) and at how the effects of the policy varied with different
school market characteristics (columns (2)-(4)).
Coefficient Posti × Treatedi in Table 2.2 represents the difference in RD coefficients for the
treated cohort with respect to the pre-policy cohort. Column (1) shows that for the full sample, on
average, there was no significant effect on the probability of enrolling in a high-performing school
for students exposed to the school performance information. However, column (2) shows that this
probability increases with the number of students enrolled in the municipality (Posti × Treatedi×
Number of students in municipality), and column (3) shows that, similarly, it increases with the
number of schools in the municipality (Posti × Treatedi× Number of schools in municipality). Fi-
nally, column (4) illustrates that the probability of enrolling in a high-performing school is also
positively affected by the proportion of this type of schools in the municipality (Posti × Treatedi×
Proportion of “green” schools in municipality).
Given the results in columns (2) and (3), I will focus my analysis on the largest school market
in Chile: Santiago’s metropolitan area. This school market also contained a higher proportion of
high-performing schools than the average, as illustrated in Table 2.3. Thus, we should expect that
the distribution of school performance information had a stronger effect in Santiago metropolitan
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area than in other municipalities in Chile.
2.5.2 Complier Characteristics
This section looks at the characteristics of students who switched enrollment decisions in re-
sponse to the distribution of school performance information. Given the design of the informa-
tion, and the fact that test scores were not adjusted by socioeconomic composition, it is possible
that not all students in a municipality could respond to the information. Particularly, since high-
performing schools were generally selective and expensive, it is likely that lower income students
in municipalities were not able to adjust their enrollment choices to the school performance in-
formation. Additionally, it is possible that the highest income students in municipalities were
already enrolled in the highest performing schools and, for this reason, could not respond to this
policy. Thus, the characterization of compliers will help understanding what students were able
to readjust their enrollment decisions in response to the information.
Compliers, in this case, are students that enrolled in high-performing schools in response to the
distribution of school performance information. In order to obtain the average characteristics of
compliers, I use a method equivalent to the one described in Chapter 1.15 I compute the proportion
of compliers with characteristic Xi through the following two-stage least squares system:
Di = θ + ψPosti × Treatedi + φPosti + ηTreatedi + g(Bi) + νi (2.2)
Xi × Di = α + βPosti + ρTreatedi + γDi + f (Bi) + ui (2.3)
where Di is an indicator variable equal to one if student i enrolled in a high-performing school
in 1st grade, Posti an indicator variable that equals one if the student was born after the enrollment
cutoff, Treatedi an indicator variable for whether the student belongs to the “treated” cohort, and
g(Bi) and f (Bi) are linear splines on distance of sixth birthday to enrollment cutoff, interacted
with whether the student was born to the right or left of the cutoff and interacted again with the
Treatedi indicator.
The coefficient γ in equation (2.3) gives the proportion of compliers with characteristic X. In
15For greater detail, please, refer to Chapter 1 Section 1.6.
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this case, students “induced” into treatment in the first stage would be those born after the enroll-
ment cutoff in the “treated” cohort, as they were exposed to the school performance information
before choosing a school.
This system can only identify the characteristics of compliers if the monotonicity assumption
holds. All students that were exposed to the distribution of school performance information had
to change enrollment decisions in the same direction. Table 2.4 provides suggestive evidence that
the monotonicity assumption holds: the difference in RD estimate in row (B) column (3) shows
that the probability of enrolling in an average-performing school decreased with the distribution
of school performance information, while the corresponding estimate for row (C) shows a similar
and significant increase in enrollment in high-performing schools. The difference in RD estimate
for low-performing schools is small and imprecise, which suggest that most switches in enroll-
ment decisions were between average-performing schools and high-performing schools.
Table 2.5 shows the average characteristics for students that enrolled in high-performing schools
in response to distribution of school performance information.16 The first panel shows that the av-
erage socioeconomic index for compliers is 72.17 The average socioeconomic index in Santiago is
0.29, therefore, compliers are significantly higher socioeconomic status than the average student
in Santiago metropolitan area.
The second panel shows the proportion of compliers by quartile of the socioeconomic index
distribution in the municipality. As the school performance information was distributed at the
municipality level, we should expect responses for students in different points of the municipality
socioeconomic distribution to differ. Results of the complier characterization go in this direction
and show that most compliers (around 65% of students switching enrollment to high-performing
schools) belong to the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution. This is con-
sistent with high-performing schools being selective and with students in the top quartile being
already enrolled in these high-performing schools, which serve the highest socioeconomic status
students. Finally, consistent with these results, the last panel shows that most compliers belong to
16Since the proportion of students by the level of education of the mother is not stable over time (see Table B.4 in the
Appendix) the results of the complier characterization by mother education are not informative and, for this reason,
excluded.
17The socioeconomic index is computed using the coefficients of a regression of normalized math SIMCE score in 4th
grade within test year on dummies for family income categories and mother’s years of education.
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the top half of the municipality socioeconomic index distribution.
Thus, the complier characterization suggests that not all students had the same ability to re-
spond to the school performance information, as high-performing schools were mostly selective
and more expensive than other schools. Students in the top half of the municipality socioeconomic
distribution and, particularly, in the third quartile were the ones that used the school performance
information and switched to higher-performing schools.
2.5.3 Enrollment choices
The rationale behind the distribution of school performance information is to help parents
choose a more effective school. Therefore, the immediate effect of distributing school perfor-
mance information should be a change in enrollment decisions. These changes in enrollment
decisions may differ for students with different socioeconomic characteristics since, as discussed
in the previous section, high-performing schools were usually selective and expensive. This sec-
tion presents results on enrollment choices for students in different quartiles of the municipality
socioeconomic distribution.
The difference in RD estimates presented in column (3) of Table 2.6 show that there were no sig-
nificant changes in the probability of enrolling in low-performing schools for students in any quar-
tile once families received school performance information. Most low-performing schools were
public school while higher performing schools were mostly voucher and elite private schools.
Therefore, since many voucher and elite private schools select students, it is likely that students
that enrolled in low-performing schools would not have been admitted in higher performance
schools or could not afford the tuition fees of these schools. For this reason, it is not surprising
that students kept enrolling in low-performing schools despite the fact that these schools were
now labeled as “bad” schools.
Enrollment in average-performing schools, however, did significantly decrease, as shown in
column (3) of Table 2.7. The difference in RD estimate shows a significant decrease in the proba-
bility of enrolling in average-performing schools for students in the first and third quartiles.18
Finally, column (3) in Table 2.8 shows that there was a significant increase in the probability of
18This result, however, is not very robust as these coefficients lose significance in some of the robustness checks.
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enrolling in high-performing schools, consistent with Hastings and Weinstein (2008), particularly
for students in the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution. This increase is
of similar magnitude to the decrease in enrollment in average-performing schools, which suggests
that students in the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution enrolled less in
average-performing schools and more in high-performing schools in response to the distribution
of school performance information. This is consistent with about 65% of compliers belonging to
this socioeconomic quartile and with the fact that high-performing schools were more expensive
and selective, preventing lower socioeconomic status students from enrolling in this category of
schools.
In order to determine how different the schools where compliers enrolled to were from schools
where compliers would have enrolled to in absence of the policy I use a parallel technique to
the one described in the previous section. I instrument enrollment in average-performing and
high-performing schools in the following two-stage least squares system to obtain average school
characteristics for compliers at baseline.
Dit = θ + ψPosti × Treatedi + φPosti + ηTreatedi + g(Bi) + νi (2.4)
Si × Dit = α + βPosti + ρTreatedi + γDit + f (Bi) + ui (2.5)
where Dit is the probability of enrolling in school of type t, Si is the school characteristic of
interest, and Posti, Treatedi and g(Bi) and f (Bi) are as defined above. The coefficient γ in equation
(2.5) gives the average of characteristic S for high-performing (destination “green”) schools where
compliers enrolled or for average-performing (counterfactual “yellow”) schools where compliers
ceased to enroll.
Unfortunately, this method cannot be used to compare current characteristics, as the distri-
bution of school performance information may directly affect current school characteristics, for
instance, through changes in student sorting. In this case, the exclusion restriction would not hold.
Table 2.9 shows the results from the two-stage least square system. Column (1) shows the aver-
age characteristics at baseline of average-performing (“yellow”) schools where compliers would
have enrolled to in absence of the policy, column (2) presents the average characteristics at base-
line of high-performing (“green”) schools where compliers enrolled to in response to the policy.
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Finally, column (3) shows the differences in average characteristics at baseline for schools where
compliers enrolled to with respect to schools where compliers would have enrolled to in absence
of the policy. As illustrated by column (3), in response to the distribution of school performance
information compliers enrolled less in public schools and more in voucher and, particularly, elite
private schools. They enrolled in more expensive schools at baseline, larger schools with larger
class sizes19, and schools that had higher baseline test scores, which is consistent with the higher
performance category of the school.
The third panel shows the differences in teacher characteristics at baseline for schools where
compliers enrolled to with respect to schools where they would have enrolled to in absence of the
policy. Column (3) shows that compliers enrolled in schools with teachers that, on average, had
4.5 less years of teaching experience, with more teachers per student and with a lower proportion
of teachers with an education degree at baseline.
Finally, the last panel shows that, thanks to the distribution of school performance information,
compliers enrolled in schools with a better socioeconomic composition. High-performing schools
where compliers enrolled to had a higher average socioeconomic index at baseline, a higher pro-
portion of students with mothers that completed university education, and lower proportions of
students with mothers that had lower levels of education at baseline. This is consistent with stu-
dents enrolling in higher performing schools since, as shown by Mizala, Romaguera and Urquiola
(2007), school test scores are highly correlated to school socioeconomic composition.
2.5.4 School Characteristics
Results from the previous section showed that, in response to the school performance infor-
mation, students, and particularly students in the third quartile of the municipality socioeco-
nomic distribution, enrolled less in average-performing schools to enroll more in high-performing
schools. This sorting of students could lead to changes in the school characteristics faced by the
group that contains most compliers, the third quartile, and, if the the number of students switching
enrollment was large enough, it could even imply changes in school characteristics for students in
19This is consistent with Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) who show an inverted-U relationship between class size
and household income. Compliers may be leaving undersubscribed lower quality schools to enroll in oversubscribed
higher quality schools.
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other quartiles. This section presents results on changes in current school characteristics faced by
students in different quartiles of the municipality socioeconomic distribution.
Table 2.10 shows changes in average class size encountered by students in different points of
the municipality socioeconomic distribution. Column (1) shows the RD coefficient for the pre-
policy cohort, column (2) presents the RD coefficient for the treated cohort, and column (3) shows
the differences in RD coefficients of column (2) minus column (1), that is, the effect of the policy
on current class size for different groups of students. Estimates in column (3) show a positive but
not significant increase in class size for students in the third and fourth quartiles, and a positive
and significant increase in current class size for students in the top half of the municipality so-
cioeconomic distribution. As shown in the previous section, compliers enrolled in schools that,
at baseline, had larger class sizes. This partly explains the positive coefficient in class size for
students in the third quartile. Additionally, compliers were enrolling in high-performing schools
that were serving, mostly, students in the third and fourth quartiles.20 Thus, the changes in en-
rollment decisions also affected class sizes of students in the top two quartiles through increasing
enrollment in high-performing schools and class sizes at these schools. The positive and signifi-
cant coefficient for students in the top half of the municipality socioeconomic distribution shows
a combination of these two effects.
Column (3) in Table 2.11 shows that, resulting from the changes in enrollment decisions for stu-
dents in the third quartile, these students ended up in schools with a better socioeconomic com-
position. This is consistent with compliers enrolling in schools that had a better socioeconomic
composition at baseline, as shown in Table 2.9. In contrast, enrollment responses of compliers do
not have an effect, on average, on the socioeconomic composition in schools where students in
the fourth quartile enrolled. Similarly, results in column (3) of Table 2.12 suggest that, on aver-
age, students in the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution exposed to the
school performance information ended up in schools with higher levels of socioeconomic segre-
gation.21 These two results suggest that, on average, students most likely to respond to the school
20See Table B.5 in the Appendix.
21The school socioeconomic integration index is the heterogeneity measure used in Urquiola (2005) and Alesina et
al. (2004). Let q = 1, 2, 3, 4 denote the quartiles of the municipality socioeconomic distribution, and define Pqs as the
proportion of students from quartile q in school s. The school socioeconomic integration index is then Is = 1−Σ4q=1Pqs.
If the school is segregated and most of its students are from the same socioeconomic quartile, then the index will be
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performance information, students in the third quartile, did encounter a better and more cohesive
socioeconomic group of peers.
Finally, Table 2.13 explores possible changes in teacher characteristics. In omitted results, I
found that there were no significant changes on the number of teachers per student or on the
proportion of teachers with a degree in education for students in any quartile. The differences
in RD coefficients in column (3) of Table 2.13 suggest, however, small but significant decreases
in teacher experience for students in the second and fourth quartiles. In contrast, there are no
significant changes on the years of experience of teachers for the group that contains most students
switching enrollment decisions, students in the third quartile. This shows that, on average, teacher
characteristics did not significantly change for students most likely to respond to the distribution
of school performance information.
These results imply that students most likely to enroll in high-performing schools in response
to the policy did find a better socioeconomic composition of students in these high-performing
schools. However, on average, there were no significant changes in any other of the school char-
acteristics analyzed.
2.5.5 Test Scores
The previous sections have shown that there were changes in enrollment choices, particularly
for students in the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution, in response to the
distribution of school performance information. Students most likely to respond ended up with a
better socioeconomic composition of peers, but there were no other significant changes in school
observable characteristics. This section analyzes the effects of the policy (and having the option
to respond to the information by switching enrollment decisions) on standardized test scores for
a test that is carried out in 4th grade, three years after enrollment choices.
First of all, Tables 2.14 and 2.15 show that there were no effects on overall test scores neither
in Math or Language when the whole student population in Chile is included. However, there
is a small positive effect on Language test scores for students that belong to the third quartile of
close to zero, while if the school has a mixed composition of students, the index will approach 0.75, the maximum in
this case, since there are only 4 groups of students. This index can be interpreted as the probability that two students
picked at random are from two different quartiles of the socioeconomic distribution.
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the municipality socioeconomic distribution, the same group that responded to the distribution of
school performance information by switching enrollment choices.22 As discussed in the Hetero-
geneity subsection, characteristics of the school market could affect responses to the policy and,
consequently, effects on test scores. For example, families in school markets with little variation in
school performance categories were not as able to respond to the information. Thus, Tables 2.16
and 2.17 focus on the largest school market in Chile, the Santiago metropolitan area.
The differences in RD estimates in column (3) of Table 2.16 show that, even though there were
some increases in Math test scores for students exposed to the information, particularly for the
first and third quartiles, these effects were not significant.
Table 2.17 analyzes the effects on Language test scores. Results in column (3) show that there
was an overall positive and significant effect on Spanish test scores. This effect is strongest and
significant for students in the top half of the municipality socioeconomic distribution and, par-
ticularly, for students most likely to enroll in high-performing schools in response to the policy,
students in the third quartile. Additionally, this effect is pretty large, it is around one third of
the effect of enrolling one year older.23 However, since these results lose significance for the full
sample and in one of the robustness checks, they can only be considered suggestive.
These results suggest that a better socioeconomic composition of peers may have stronger ef-
fects on verbal achievement than on math achievement. This could be consistent with Zimmerman
(2003), since he finds a higher correlation of own achievement with peers’ verbal scores than math
scores.
Additionally, these results show that there were no negative effects for any group of students
caused by the distribution of school performance information, despite the possible stigmatization
of schools. Therefore, from an efficiency perspective, results suggest that this policy had positive
effects, as there was an overall increase in Spanish test scores. However, from an equity perspec-
tive, since only students in the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution were
able to respond to the information, this could improve education opportunities only for students
in this quartile. There is the possibility that this led to small increases in inequality in the medium
22See table B.1 in the Appendix.
23As estimated by McEwan and Shapiro (2006).
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run due to an unequal improvement in education opportunities.
2.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
This section presents results that address possible concerns regarding the main specification or
the assumptions used in this paper.
As discussed in the Data section, there is no official description of the criteria used to determine
the school classification. Therefore, Table B.6 shows that the enrollment results of this analysis are
in general robust to using Allende’s (2011) classification of schools, despite a loss of significance
in the coefficients corresponding to the probability of enrolling in average-performing schools.24
Another possible concern is that the last pre-policy cohort may not be representative of the
existing pre-trends. For this reason, Table B.7 includes, additionally, the cohort of students born
around the 2008 enrollment cutoff (that enrolled in 2008 and 2009) in the pre-policy sample.25
Results in this case are generally consistent both in magnitude and significance, except for the
case of Spanish test scores. In this case, the coefficient for students in the third quartile is still
positive and the largest of all student groups, but it loses significance. For this reason, I consider
the results in Spanish test scores suggestive.
Finally, a last concern is the possibility that the choice of bandwidth or the existence of other
enrollment cutoffs may be biasing the estimates. Table B.8 addresses this concern by repeating the
analysis using a 45 day bandwidth, instead of the 90 day bandwidth used in the main specification.
In this case, since the sample size is reduced in half, several results lose significance. In spite of
this, the sign of the coefficients is the same as in the main specification and the magnitude of the
estimates is very similar to the magnitude of the results in the main specification. Therefore, my
results are robust to the use of a smaller bandwidth and the choice of bandwidth does not seem to
be biasing my results.
24Allende (2011) divides schools in three groups depending on the availability of test score results for 4th and 8th
grades. Then, she classifies schools within each group in the three performance categories.
25Since in 2008 there was a major school reform that had delayed effects, it is likely that students that enrolled in 2008
and 2009 were still affected by this policy. For this reason, I do not include students born around the 2008 enrollment
cutoff in the pre-policy cohort in my main specification.
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2.7 CONCLUSION
School accountability has been expanding in the last decades and particularly in the last few
years, with a significant increase in the number and frequency of standardized student testing.
One possible consequence of school accountability, if school performance information is available,
is changes in enrollment choices, which could, in turn, affect school future performance. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to understand how student sorting interacts with school accountability
systems in order to correctly interpret changes in school performance indicators.
There is some evidence on enrollment responses to school performance information (e.g., Hast-
ings and Weinstein, 2008), but results in this area are mixed. This suggests that the format and
distribution channel of the information play an important role in order for the information to be
effective.
In this paper, I analyze the effects of the distribution of simplified school performance informa-
tion that was not adjusted by socioeconomic composition of schools and that included all schools,
even elite private schools. Additionally, using two sources of variation, I characterize students
responding to the information and decompose the aggregate effects of the policy by looking at
effects on students at different points of the municipality socioeconomic distribution.
Results show that not all students were able to respond to the information, since high-performing
schools were generally selective and expensive. Thus, the group of students that switched enroll-
ment decisions belonged, mostly, to the third quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distri-
bution. This implies that the immediate effect of the policy was to allow medium-high income
students to enroll in higher-performing schools, while keeping lower income students in the same
schools.
Thanks to the school performance information, students in the third quartile had peers from
a higher socioeconomic status, while other observable school characteristics did not significantly
change. Test score results suggest that there was an overall increase in verbal test scores for stu-
dents in the Santiago metropolitan area, driven by improvements for the third quartile and no
negative effects for other quartiles, while math test scores did not significantly change. This could
indicate that peer effects could be stronger in verbal than math achievement, which is consistent
with results in Zimmerman (2003).
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From an efficiency point of view this is an optimistic result, since a low-cost policy, such as
sending families school performance information, allowed students to sort into higher-performing
schools and led to an increase in achievement. However, not all students in the population bene-
fited equally from the policy, as lower-income students were not able to respond to the informa-
tion. As a consequence, the policy increased education opportunities and achievement for stu-
dents in the third quartile while not directly affecting lower income students, reducing education
equity.
Additionally, these results show that the way the information is presented and distributed
matters. Since the information was not adjusted by school socioeconomic composition, and so-
cioeconomic status is highly correlated with performance (Mizala, Romaguera, Urquiola, 2007),
schools in the high-performing category were mostly out of reach for students in the lower half of
the municipality socioeconomic distribution. This policy may have been more effective had school
performance information been adjusted by school socioeconomic composition.
Regarding the distribution of information, Mizala and Urquiola (2010) found no effects of re-
ceiving school quality information through the media. In this policy, all parents received the
school information directly at home together with a letter from the President and the Minister of
Education. Thus, parents may respond more to school performance information if the information
is directly addressed to them.
In conclusion, this paper shows that the distribution of school performance information could
lead to sorting of students into higher-performing schools and to an improvement in achievement.
However, policy-makers need to be careful regarding the format and distribution of the informa-
tion, since parents may respond differently to information presented in different ways, and this
could potentially lead to a reduction in education equity.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 2.1: School characteristics by category - year 2009








Proportion of schools in category 0.167 0.567 0.267
Proportion of public schools 0.594 0.307 0.060
Proportion of voucher schools 0.402 0.647 0.479
Proportion of elite private schools 0.005 0.046 0.462
Proportion of schools participating in SEP 0.863 0.639 0.182
Average copay (2013 USD) 2.9 14.7 42.9
Prop. of students that claim school was selective 0.68 0.768 0.896
Average school socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) -54.4 0.1 122.2
Proportion of mothers with basic ed. or less (1st-4th) 0.272 0.145 0.027
Proportion of mothers with university ed. (1st-4th) 0.019 0.074 0.318
Proportion of Chile Solidario students (1st-4th) 0.307 0.169 0.054
Proportion of prioritized students (1st-4th) 0.667 0.449 0.154
Proportion of male students (1st-4th) 0.549 0.525 0.512
Standardized 4th grade Math score -0.703 -0.133 0.538
Number of students in class (1st) 29.1 32.2 27.4
Number of students in school (1st-4th) 161.5 223.5 242.4
Number of teachers per student (%) 6.6 6.4 11.8
Teaching experience in years 17.4 15.4 14.7
Teacher age 46.0 43.4 42.3
Teachers with a degree in education (%) 93.9 94.2 94.8
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Figure 2.1: Probability of enrolling in the next academic year by distance from the date of birth to
the June 30th enrollment cutoff
Notes: Each circle above represents the proportion of students that turned six years of age on that day and enrolled
in 2011 instead of 2010 within 90 days of the June 30, 2010 enrollment cutoff. Since the policy was planned and
implemented after the 2010 school year had started, there is no possibility of startegically delaying enrollment to
obtain the information before making a choice.
Table 2.2: Heterogeneity by School Market Characteristics – Changes in the probability of en-
rolling in a high-performing schools (green)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Number of Number of Proportion of
students schools “green” schools
Posti × Treatedi 0.0019 -0.0135 -0.0164 -0.0120
(0.0073) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0093)
Posti × Treatedi× Number of students in municipality – 1.64e-06* – –
(8.61e-07)
Posti × Treatedi× Number of schools in municipality – – 0.0004* –
(0.0002)
Posti × Treatedi× Prop. of “green” schools in municipality – – – 0.0678**
(0.0329)
Observations 235,081 235,081 235,081 235,081
R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.145
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each column represents a separate
regression with the first coefficient representing the difference in the RD coefficients for the post-policy period with
respect to the pre-policy period. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of
distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. In columns (2)-(5) the linear spline is additionally interacted with the
variable with respect to which heterogeneity is measured.
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Table 2.3: Proportion of Schools by Category in 2009
Chile Santiago
Proportion of low-performing schools (red) 0.114 0.123
Proportion of average-performing schools (yellow) 0.642 0.578
Proportion of high-performing schools (green) 0.239 0.296
Notes: Each coefficient represents the proportion of schools that belong to that performance category weighted by
enrollment.
Table 2.4: Check of Monotonicity Assumption: Probability of enrollment in school by classification
(1st grade)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
(A) Low-performing schools (red) -0.012* -0.003 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
(B) Average-performing schools (yellow) -0.007 -0.038*** -0.032**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
(C) High-performing schools (green) 0.017* 0.044*** 0.027*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
Observations 33,864 32,995 66,859
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the Santiago
metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD
estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while column (2) for year
2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1) including a full
set of cohort dummies.
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Table 2.5: Complier characteristics - Proportion of compliers by level of mother education and
position in socioeconomic index distribution
Compliers
Average socioeconomic index 72.06
(72.00)
1st quartile of Socieconomic index in municipality 0.263
(0.254)
2nd quartile of Socieconomic index in municipality 0.082
(0.305)
3rd quartile of Socieconomic index in municipality 0.664
(0.393)
4th quartile of Socieconomic index in municipality -0.008
(0.397)
Below median of Socieconomic index in municipality 0.345
(0.342)
Above median of Socieconomic index in municipality 0.655
(0.342)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the standard deviations are in
brackets. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. Enrollment in voucher school is instrumented with the
interaction of the dummy of turning six after the enrollment cutoff and the indicator for belonging to the treated
cohorts. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending school in Santiago
metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows the
complier characteristics including all years in the sample and a full set of cohort dummies.
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Table 2.6: School choices: Probability of enrollment in low-performing schools - red (1st grade)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students -0.0123* -0.0033 0.0090
(0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0097)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0302 -0.0014 0.0288
(0.0193) (0.0183) (0.0266)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0175 0.0025 0.0200
(0.0155) (0.0144) (0.0212)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0006 -0.0236** -0.0230
(0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0152)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0238** -0.0227** 0.0010
(0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0147)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0237* -0.0010 0.0227
(0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0171)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0107 -0.0231*** -0.0124
(0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0107)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table 2.7: School choices: Probability of enrollment in average-performing schools - yellow (1st
grade)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students -0.0067 -0.0382*** -0.0316**
(0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0155)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.0532** -0.0038 -0.0570*
(0.0235) (0.0245) (0.0340)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0410* -0.0388 0.0022
(0.0237) (0.0253) (0.0347)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0141 -0.0790*** -0.0649*
(0.0244) (0.0266) (0.0361)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0365 -0.0412 -0.0047
(0.0274) (0.0283) (0.0394)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.0062 -0.0229 -0.0291
(0.0167) (0.0177) (0.0243)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0235 -0.0612*** -0.0376
(0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0267)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table 2.8: School choices: Probability of enrollment in high-performing schools - green (1st grade)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.0173* 0.0438*** 0.0266*
(0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0146)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.0202 0.0144 0.0346
(0.0176) (0.0199) (0.0265)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.0546*** 0.0398* -0.0148
(0.0208) (0.0238) (0.0316)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.0095 0.1030*** 0.0939***
(0.0241) (0.0263) (0.0356)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.0540* 0.0606** 0.0067
(0.0276) (0.0286) (0.0398)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.0169 0.0302* 0.0134
(0.0137) (0.0157) (0.0208)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.0284 0.0831*** 0.0547**
(0.0183) (0.0194) (0.0267)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table 2.9: School characteristics at baseline (2009) for compliers
(1) (2) (3)
Counterfactual Destination Difference
“yellow” schools “green” schools
Enrolled in public schools 0.249 -0.255 -0.504
(0.321) (0.247)
Enrolled in voucher schools 0.668 0.775 0.107
(0.326) (0.367)
Enrolled in elite private schools 0.083 0.480 0.397
(0.090) (0.333)
Enrolled in voucher schools with copay 0.677 0.715 0.038
(0.350) (0.353)
Average school copay in 2013 USD -9.99 17.67 27.66
(24.67) (42.47)
School av. class size (1st-4th) 28.94 32.48 3.54
(5.45) (5.04)
Enrollment (1st-4th) 376.9 535.2 158.3
(166.4) (157.2)
Average score 4th grade SIMCE score -0.177 0.542 0.719
(0.209) (0.224)
Average teacher age (school) 41.68 42.25 0.57
(3.72) (2.87)
Years of teaching experience (school) 14.56 9.90 -4.66
(3.97) (4.04)
Number of teachers in class (school) 34.61 94.43 59.82
(15.75) (34.52)
School teachers per student (%) (school) 5.005 7.698 2.693
(1.766) (2.836)
Proportion of male teachers (school) 0.083 0.207 0.124
(0.114) (0.093)
Teachers with degree in education (%) (school) 98.17 90.91 -7.26
(4.65) (4.10)
Av. socioeconomic index (2009 - 1st-4th) -2.37 120.40 122.77
(32.35) (53.38)
Proportion of mothers with basic (1st-4th) 0.120 0.055 -0.065
(0.065) (0.034)
Proportion of mothers with high school (1st-4th) 0.664 0.383 -0.281
(0.083) (0.149)
Proportion of mothers with university (1st-4th) 0.047 0.252 0.205
(0.054) (0.147)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. Enrollment in
voucher and public school are instrumented with the interaction of the dummy of turning six after the enrollment
cutoff and the indicator for belonging to the treated cohorts. The regressions above use a window of 90 days use the
sample of students attending schools in Santiago’s metropolitan area and include all years. They also include a linear
spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.
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Table 2.10: School characteristics: Average Class Size (1st grade)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students -0.018 0.038 0.056
(0.177) (0.179) (0.252)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.072 -0.123 -0.052
(0.378) (0.406) (0.555)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.088 0.037 -0.051
(0.398) (0.410) (0.572)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.330 0.375 0.704
(0.400) (0.418) (0.578)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.317 0.687 1.004
(0.430) (0.447) (0.620)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.005 -0.037 -0.042
(0.275) (0.288) (0.398)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.325 0.520* 0.845**
(0.293) (0.305) (0.423)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table 2.11: School characteristics: Average Socioeconomic Index (1st-4th grades)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.028 0.052*** 0.025
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.001 -0.019 -0.019
(0.028) (0.032) (0.043)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.060 0.051 -0.009
(0.037) (0.043) (0.057)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.023 0.154*** 0.131**
(0.046) (0.047) (0.066)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.069 0.089* 0.020
(0.045) (0.045) (0.064)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.029 0.024 -0.005
(0.024) (0.028) (0.036)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.043 0.123*** 0.081*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.046)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table 2.12: School characteristics: School Integration Index (1st grade, in %)
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students -0.225 -0.479 -0.254
(0.327) (0.339) (0.471)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.232 1.084 1.316
(0.720) (0.742) (1.034)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.431 -0.048 -0.479
(0.503) (0.592) (0.777)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.389 -1.452** -1.840*
(0.636) (0.740) (0.976)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -1.848* -0.921 0.927
(1.059) (1.052) (1.493)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.076 0.597 0.522
(0.447) (0.478) (0.655)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.560 -1.185* -0.625
(0.593) (0.636) (0.869)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
80
Table 2.13: School characteristics: Teachers Experience
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.019 -0.251** -0.270
(0.116) (0.124) (0.170)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.258 -0.475* -0.217
(0.270) (0.286) (0.394)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.179 -0.519* -0.699*
(0.263) (0.286) (0.389)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.203 -0.230 -0.433
(0.240) (0.278) (0.367)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.396 -0.390 -0.786*
(0.268) (0.304) (0.405)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.040 -0.522** -0.482*
(0.189) (0.203) (0.278)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.298* -0.300 -0.598**
(0.179) (0.206) (0.273)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
81
Table 2.14: School outcomes: Math Scores in 4th Grade Standardized Test – Full sample
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.165*** 0.158*** -0.00742
(0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0185)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.153*** 0.131*** -0.022
(0.027) (0.027) (0.039)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.206*** 0.202*** -0.004
(0.026) (0.027) (0.038)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.164*** 0.193*** 0.029
(0.026) (0.027) (0.038)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.135*** 0.127*** -0.008
(0.026) (0.027) (0.038)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.175*** 0.162*** -0.013
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.153*** 0.165*** 0.012
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a
separate regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from
birthday to enrollment cutoff. Test scores are comparable over time and normalized with respect to test scores for 2012
(corresponding to students who enrolled in 2009). Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within
90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while column (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the
RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table 2.15: School outcomes: Spanish Scores in 4th Grade Standardized Test – Full sample
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.157*** 0.179*** 0.022
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.140*** 0.168*** 0.028
(0.026) (0.026) (0.037)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.192*** 0.218*** 0.025
(0.026) (0.027) (0.037)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.140*** 0.206*** 0.066*
(0.025) (0.027) (0.037)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.147*** 0.139*** -0.009
(0.025) (0.026) (0.037)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.162*** 0.188*** 0.026
(0.019) (0.019) (0.026)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.146*** 0.177*** 0.031
(0.018) (0.019) (0.026)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a
separate regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from
birthday to enrollment cutoff. Test scores are comparable over time and normalized with respect to test scores for 2012
(corresponding to students who enrolled in 2009). Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within
90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while column (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the
RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table 2.16: School outcomes: Math Scores in 4th Grade Standardized Test – Students in Santiago
metropolitan area
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.074*** 0.108*** 0.033
(0.025) (0.025) (0.035)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.049 0.118** 0.069
(0.054) (0.053) (0.075)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.093* 0.072 -0.021
(0.052) (0.052) (0.073)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.055 0.149*** 0.094
(0.049) (0.052) (0.071)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.058 0.072 0.014
(0.054) (0.053) (0.075)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.070* 0.099*** 0.029
(0.037) (0.037) (0.053)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.054 0.112*** 0.058
(0.036) (0.037) (0.052)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Test scores are
comparable over time and normalized with respect to test scores for 2012 (corresponding to students who enrolled in
2009). Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year
2009, while column (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with
respect to column (1).
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Table 2.17: School outcomes: Spanish Scores in 4th Grade Standardized Test – students in Santiago
metropolitan area
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.046* 0.12*** 0.075**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.034)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.025 0.128** 0.103
(0.052) (0.052) (0.073)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.065 0.093* 0.028
(0.051) (0.051) (0.072)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.031 0.154*** 0.124*
(0.047) (0.052) (0.070)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.020 0.100* 0.080
(0.053) (0.053) (0.075)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.045 0.114*** 0.070
(0.036) (0.034) (0.052)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.024 0.128*** 0.104**
(0.035) (0.037) (0.051)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Test scores are
comparable over time and normalized with respect to test scores for 2012 (corresponding to students who enrolled in
2009). Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year
2009, while column (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with
respect to column (1).
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Chapter 3
Educational Shocks and the Distribution
of Wages. Evidence from Colombia
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the proportion of college graduates and the college wage premium
has been extensively studied, especially for the US (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Teulings and
van Rens, 2008). The evidence supports a strong negative relationship between the proportion
of educated workers and the wage premium, keeping demand constant (e.g., Card and Lemieux,
2001; Angrist, 1995). However, a decrease in the wage premium can indicate a decrease in average
wages for college graduates, an increase in average wages for high school graduates, or both. Sim-
ilarly, an increase in the proportion of college graduates can affect differently workers at different
points of the wage distribution. Thus, in order to understand the effects on wages of a change in
the educational structure of the labor force, the whole wage distribution needs to be analyzed.
In this paper I study the effects of an expansion in the tertiary education system in Colombia
on the distribution of wages for workers with different education levels. In 1995, in response to
the educational reform carried out through the “Ley 30” (December 1992), there was a significant
expansion of the tertiary education sector in Colombia. This led to a rise in the proportion of young
workers with tertiary education from around 25% for workers who accessed the labor market prior
to the reform to over 40% for workers exposed to the reform.
I use education and labor market information from household surveys for 2001, 2002, 2011 and
2012 to carry out this analysis. I address the question by using two different empirical strategies:
a reweighting method and a differences in differences strategy.
First, I exploit the timing of the policy and use the reweighting method developed by DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to build a counterfactual distribution of wages. I focus on workers be-
tween 27 and 34 years of age, since these were the workers exposed to the expansion in the tertiary
education system in the post-policy sample (the 2011/2012 sample). These workers had not en-
tered the labor market yet in the pre-policy sample (the 2001/02 sample), thus, I reweight the
distribution of wages for workers between 27 and 34 years in the pre-policy sample (the 2001/02
sample) to mimic the distribution of characteristics of the post-policy sample. The difference be-
tween the post-policy distribution of wages and the reweighted pre-policy distribution of wages
shows the changes in the structure of wages. Unfortunately, this method does not allow to con-
trol for labor demand shifts and productivity changes, which could lead to positive biases in my
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results, for this reason, I use a second empirical strategy.
In my second strategy, I assume that workers of different ages are imperfect substitutes (Card
and Lemieux, 2001), and I define a “control” group within each sample: older workers. This way
I can address the question in a differences-in-differences setting using the “treated” and “control”
groups, workers between 27 and 34 years and workers between 37 and 44 years, respectively, in
the pre-policy (2001/02) and post-policy (2011/12) samples. Then, I take differences-in-differences
in wage distributions, which allows me to control for changes in the wage structure that affected
also the “control” group, such as possible changes in productivity that increased the whole dis-
tribution of wages or shifts in the labor demand. In contrast, this method does not control for
changes in the composition of workers in each education group, which could lead to negative
biases in my results within education levels, as “lower ability” workers were completing higher
levels of education. Finally, I use differences-in-differences regressions to analyze changes in av-
erage wages.
The first stage results of this analysis show a general increase in education in the population,
with the density of workers by years of education shifting to higher values. Regarding the wage
distribution, the reweighting method shows a shift towards higher wages for workers exposed to
the increase in the proportion of educated workers, but this increase is reduced when I control
for the economic conditions at the time of entering the labor market for the first time. The results
of the differences-in-differences strategy show some decrease in dispersion, but no change on the
distribution of wages, which suggests that productivity factors or labor demand shifts may have
been causing the shift in the wage distribution.
Since the results of the reweighting method may be overestimated due to possible changes in
labor demand and productivity,1 this result could be interpreted as an upper-bound. In contrast,
the results of the differences-in-differences strategy may be downward biased, due to changes in
composition. The expansion of the tertiary education system led to “lower ability” workers to
complete higher levels of education, which worsened the composition of workers by education
levels. Consequently, these results can be interpreted as a lower-bound on the analysis. There-
fore, the two sets of results interpreted together will give suggestive evidence of changes in wage
1The period studied was a period of economic growth in Colombia with annual GDP growth of over 3% for most
years. Therefore, if there were any labor demand shifts, they should be positive and have a positive effect on wages.
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distributions for workers with different levels of education.
The reweighting method and the differences-in-differences strategy point towards the same
result for workers with low-levels of education: there was some shift in the distribution of wages
towards higher wages, although this shift was small. Wages for workers with high school educa-
tion seem to concentrate in both strategies, with a reduction in the density in high wages and an
increase in the density of wages around the mode. Finally, the density of wages for workers with
tertiary education decreases at high levels of wages using both strategies, with a shift of the wage
distribution towards lower wages.
Results of the differences-in-differences regressions show no significant changes on average
wages for any education group in response to the change in the educational structure of the la-
bor force. Despite the insignificant results, the coefficients seem to go in the expected direction
given the results from the wage distributions, with an increase in average wages for workers with
primary education or less and a decrease in wages for workers with tertiary education.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First of all, it contributes to the literature on
how shocks to the proportion of educated workers affect wages of non-educated workers. This
literature is composed by research on Comparative Advantage and on Signaling and is mainly
theoretical. Thus, this paper provides an empirical assesment of these two literatures, which have
opposing conclusions.
On the one hand, with a very old tradition that started with Roy’s paper in 1951, the Compara-
tive Advantage literature predicts the sorting of workers into the education level in which they are
comparatively better. Therefore, easing the access to tertiary education implies a transfer of “low
quality” high school graduates to “low quality” tertiary education graduates. Then, as a response
to an increase in the proportion of educated workers, average wages for tertiary education grad-
uates should decrease, while average high school wages should increase (e.g., Rosen and Willis,
1979; Carneiro and Lee, 2005). On the other hand, based on Spence (1973), a branch of the Signal-
ing literature predicts exactly the opposite effect on uneducated wages. In the presence of credit
constraints, the initial pool of uneducated workers is composed by low ability workers and work-
ers with high ability and low financial resources. Once education costs are reduced, high ability
workers enroll in tertiary education leaving only low ability workers in the uneducated pool of
workers. As a consequence, wages for uneducated workers are reduced (e.g., Willen, Hendel and
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Shapiro, 2005; Balart, 2012).
My results suggest that both, the Comparative Advantage hypothesis and the Signaling hy-
pothesis are holding in this case. Workers with primary education or less experience increases in
their wage distribution, which is consistent with the Comparative Advantage literature, i.e. the
“best” uneducated workers being left in the pool of uneducated workers. In contrast, workers at
the top of the high school graduate wage distribution experience decreases in wages. This could
be explained by the “high ability” high school graduates completing tertiary education in the post-
policy period and employers taking high school education as a “signal” that the worker is “low
ability”.
Additionally, this paper contributes to the Skill-Biased Technological Change hypothesis (SBTC)
literature by looking at the effects on wages of educated workers. According to the Skill-Biased
Technological Change hypothesis (SBTC), technological advancement implies a rise in the relative
demand for educated workers (e.g., Goldin and Katz, 1996; Autor, Krueger and Katz, 1998) and
in their relative wages. My results show a decrease in wages for workers with tertiary education
while there were no shifts on wages with high school education. This implies that the increase
in the proportion of educated workers due to the expansion of the tertiary education system was
sufficient to satisfy the increase in the demand for educated workers, actually reducing wages for
this group.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on general equilibrium effects of education
policies on wages (e.g., Bianchi, 2016; Duflo, 2004; Abbot et al., 2013). I find an increase in wages
for students with primary education or less in response to the rise in the proportion of workers
with tertiary education, which implies that this policy not only affected the wage premium for
tertiary education, but also wages for lower levels of education.
The organization of this paper is as follows: section 2 includes an explanation of the shock in
the proportion of educated workers suffered by Colombia, section 3 describes the data used, sec-
tion 4 describes the empirical strategy, section 5 shows the results and, finally, section 6 concludes.
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3.2 BACKGROUND
In 1992, Colombia’s government regulated the higher education system for the first time through
the “Ley 30”. This law was a very comprehensive law that created several control and advice in-
stitutions for higher education, regulated the functioning of the public higher education system,
and planned a substantial increase in the public expenditure on higher education. Additionally it
created the National System of Accreditation for higher education institutions,2 explicitly allowed
the entry of private higher education institutions and reinforced the role of the ICETEX (i.e. the
Colombian institution that awards scholarships and student loans). The “Ley 30” expanded the
resources that the ICETEX would be responsible for, established the criteria according to which
scholarships and student loans would be granted, and gave the ICETEX the role of guarantor of
those student loans awarded by the financial sector to students with low economic resources.
As a result of the “Ley 30”, there was an unprecedented entry of private higher education insti-
tutions (see Figure 3.1), and a higher availability of public resources for higher education. These
two facts, together with the larger proportion of population that completed secondary education,
led to a trend break in tertiary education enrollment that took place in 1995 (see Figure 3.2).
Despite some cohort crowding that resulted in a lower probability of graduation (Herrera
Prada, 2011), this expansion in the tertiary education system led to an increase in the propor-
tion of educated workers for the cohorts exposed to the policy. This can be observed in Figure 3.3
panel C, the proportion of workers younger than 35 with tertiary education was higher in the post-
policy sample than in the pre-policy sample. These workers exposed to the policy faced a higher
proportion of workers with tertiary education in the labor market, which could have affected their
wages.
Lower levels of education were not affected by the expansion in the tertiary education sector.
Panels A and B in Figure 3.3 show that there was a general decrease in the proportion of workers
with primary education or less for students of all ages between the pre-policy and the post-policy
sample and an increase in the proportion of workers with high school education for the genera-
tion not exposed to the policy only. This suggests that, while there was a general trend towards
2Sistema Nacional de Acreditación.
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completing high school education instead of dropping out after primary education, the policy led
to an increase in the proportion of workers with tertiary education while keeping workers with
high school education constant.
The tertiary education system in Colombia is composed by three different levels of education:
technical education, technological education and university education. Technical education is ori-
ented to operational and instrumental occupations and usually lasts around 2 years. Technological
education is slightly larger, with a duration of around 3.5 years, and offers further education on oc-
cupations and professional training. Finally, university education takes around 5 years, although
there are students that take up to 8 years to complete it, and takes place at Universities, which are
institutions that carry out scientific or technological research. Unfortunately, the data used for this
analysis does not allow to disaggregate tertiary education in these three levels.
3.3 DATA: COLOMBIA’S HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 2001-2011
This paper uses data from the Continuous Household Survey3 for 2001 and 2002 and for its
newer version, the Integrated Household Survey4 for 2011 and 2012. These household surveys
are administered by Colombia’s National Statistical Administrative Department5 and the survey
microdata is public and accessible. They contain information on wages, hours of work, education
level and other demographic characteristics and represent the whole population of Colombia.
Since the expansion in the tertiary education system took place in 1995, I will define the 2001
and 2002 household surveys (ECH) as my pre-policy sample and the 2011 and 2012 household
surveys (GEIH) as my post-policy sample. Wages in the post-policy sample for young workers
exposed to the shock include changes in the wage structure caused by the change in the educa-
tional structure of the labor market.
Due to possible heterogeneous effects on wages by sex or by residence, I limit the sample to
men who live in urban areas. Additionally, I focus the analysis on workers who are between 27
and 34 years of age at the time of the survey, since these workers belong to the cohorts exposed to
3Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH).
4Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH).
5Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE).
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the expansion of the tertiary education system when they completed high school education. The
lower limit of 27 years of age is chosen to allow individuals to complete tertiary education, since
there are some workers who take up to 8 years to complete university education.
I exclude from the sample self-employed individuals, and individuals working without pay.
Furthermore, I exclude those workers with wages lower than the 5th percentile and higher than
the 95th percentile, as I consider these observations outliers. In order to be able to compare across
individuals, I consider wages per hour. Finally, I deflate wages to the 2001 Colombian pesos value
so wages can be compared across survey years.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the full sample, the sample of individuals in the pre-
policy sample (ECH 2001/02), and the sample of individuals in the post-policy sample (GEIH
2011/12). There are no large differences in terms of demographic characteristics between the two
samples, with a similar proportion of male workers and a small decrease in the proportion of
married workers. However, consistent with the policy studied, there are some differences in the
proportion of workers by level of education. There is a decrease in the proportion of workers in the
post-policy sample that completed primary education or less or high school and a corresponding
increase in the proportion of workers that completed tertiary education.
Regarding job market indicators, there are no differences in the proportion of workers em-
ployed in the two samples and there is a small increase in the proportion of self-employed workers
in the post-policy sample. Finally, wages per hour seem to increase on average in the post-policy
sample.
3.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
I use two different empirical strategies to identify the effects of the expansion in the tertiary
education system on wage distributions for workers with different levels of education. First of all,
I use the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (2006) reweighting method, and then I use a differences-in-
differences strategy. The two subsections below provide the details of each one of these strategies.
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3.4.1 Reweighting method
In this first strategy I use one source of variation: the timing of the policy. Since the expansion
in the tertiary education system started in 1995, it affected mostly students finishing high school
around that time, this means, students that were around 18 years in 1995. Thus, students exposed
to the policy were 25 or younger in the pre-policy sample and 35 or younger in the post-policy
sample.
Since my analysis focuses on workers between 27 and 34 years of age, workers exposed to the
policy at the time of deciding whether to pursue tertiary education are excluded of the pre-policy
sample. This means that he 2001/02 sample is not affected by the policy, while workers between
27 and 34 years in the post-policy sample were affected by the policy. Comparing distributions
of wages for workers in these two samples, however, would lead to biased results. First of all,
it is possible that the composition of workers in these two samples differs. Also, a simple com-
parison of wage distributions would not account for changes in education of the labor force. As
a consequence, I need to build a counterfactual wage distribution that replicates the composition
and educational structure of the post-policy wage distribution but keeps the wage structure of the
pre-policy wage distribution.
To do so, I use the reweighting method developed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996).
Following their method, I rescale the observations of the sample that was in the labor market
before the shock to mimic the distribution of characteristics of the sample affected by the shock.
Assuming that the structure of wages after the shock does not depend on the distribution of
characteristics, the hypothetical density of wages before the shock with the distribution of charac-
teristics and education corresponding to the sample after the shock can be written as:
f (w; tw = pre, tx = post) =
∫
f (w|x, tw = pre)dF(x|tx = post) (3.1)
≡
∫











× P(tx = pre)
P(tx = post)
(3.4)
where P(tx = t|x) can be estimated using the following probit model:
P(tx = t|x) = P(ε > −β′x) = 1−Φ(−β′x) (3.5)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative normal distribution. The unconditional probability P(tx = t) is
simply estimated by the proportion of observations that belong to the sample of the year t.
Once these weights have been calculated, I use them in a kernel density estimation to obtain the
wage distribution that would have prevailed for workers in the pre-policy sample (not exposed to
the expansion in the tertiary education sector) if the distribution of characteristics and education
levels had been the same as the observed in the post-policy sample.









where K(.) is the Epanechnikov kernel, and h is the bandwidth.
Additionally, since it has been shown that the economic conditions at the moment of entering
the labor market affect wages substantially (Oreopoulos, Heisz and Von Wachter, 2012), I estimate
the wage distributions controlling for the economic circumstances at the moment of entering the
labor force.
To do so, I estimate the density of the residual obtained from a regression of the logarithm
of wage on constant GDP growth at the moment of entering the labor force. The resulting wage
densities estimated using this residual are net from the shifts in the wage structure caused by
shocks to the economic conditions.
The counterfactual wage densities represent the wage density that would have prevailed if the
individual characteristics and education levels had been at their post-policy level and workers
had been paid according to the pre-policy wage structure. A comparison of the estimate of the
wage distribution for the post-policy and for the reweighted pre-policy sample shows the change
in the wage structure net from the change in sample composition and education.
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However, since productivity changes and labor demand shifts may also be shifting the wage
distribution, the evidence obtained from the estimate of the reweighted wage distribution is not
sufficient to conclude that the policy shifted wages in a given direction. For this reason, I use
a second empirical strategy that allows me to control for market-wide labor demand shifts and
productivity changes.
3.4.2 Differences-in-differences
The second empirical strategy uses two sources of variation: the timing of the policy, the fact
that the pre-policy sample was not affected by the policy, and worker age. As Card and Lemieux
(2001) show, workers of different ages are imperfect substitutes in the labor market. This implies
that wages of workers that were not exposed to the expansion in the tertiary education system
when they finished high school but that belong to the post-policy sample should be less affected
than wages of workers that were exposed to the expansion in tertiary education. Thus, I can
define a “control” group of workers within each one of the samples: older workers. Particularly,
I define workers between 37 and 44 years old as the “control” group.6 This control group is not
perfect, since wages for older workers could still be affected. If this is the case, wages for the
“treatment” and “control” groups would move in the same direction and my estimates would be
underestimated.
This definition of a “control” group allows me to define four groups of workers in a differences-
in-differences setting: young workers (“treated”) in the post-policy sample, these workers are
the ones directly affected by the shock, older workers in the post-policy sample, young workers
(“treated”) in the pre-policy sample and older workers in the pre-policy sample.
Since the distribution of wages for older workers may differ to that of younger workers, the
first difference consists in subtracting the kernel density estimate of the wage distribution of older
workers to the estimate of the wage distribution for younger workers for both, the post-policy and
pre-policy samples. This first difference for the post-policy sample includes changes in the wage
structure due to experience or age and due to exposure to the expansion on tertiary education.
Then, the second difference consists on subtracting the difference for the pre-policy sample
6Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows no visible changes in how average wages evolve with age between the pre-policy
and the post-policy samples for the current definition of the “control” group.
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from the difference for the post-policy sample. This allows to control for usual changes in the
wage structure for older workers and also for pre-trends such as the ongoing decrease in the
proportion of workers with primary education.
In summary, I will take differences of the kernel density estimates of wage distributions as
follows:
Post-policy sample Pre-policy sample
young (“treated”) cohort young (“treated”) cohort
- -
Post-policy sample Pre-policy sample
older (“control”) cohort older (“control”) cohort
Difference Post-policy - Difference Pre-policy
=
Estimate of policy effects
This strategy allows to control for changes in the wage structure of younger workers with re-
spect to the wage structure of older workers that are constant between the two periods. Addition-
ally, it allows to control for demand shifts and productivity shocks that affected equally older and
younger workers, which was the main potential bias in the results of the reweighting method.
I will also control for the possible effects that labor market initial conditions had on wages, as
shown by Oreopoulos, Heisz and Von Wachter (2012), by estimating the density of the hourly
wage net of the effects of this initial conditions, that is, using the residual of the regression of log
hourly wage on GDP growth on the year of entering the labor market for the first time. In contrast,
this strategy does not allow to control for changes in the composition of workers in each one of
the education levels caused by the policy.
Since the policy eased the access to tertiary education, it is plausible to assume that the com-
position of workers in all three education levels worsened after the expansion in the tertiary edu-
cation system. Thus, if changes in the composition of workers introduce a bias in my results, this
bias should be negative and results should be underestimated.
Finally, I use the differences-in-differences strategy to carry out some regressions of the effects
of the expansion on the tertiary education system on average wages.
log(wagei) = β1 + β2 posti + β3treatedi + β4 posti × treatedi + g(expi) + γXi + φregion + εi (3.7)
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where log(wagei) is the logarithm of the hourly gross wage for individual i, posti is a dummy
variable equal to one if the observation of the worker belongs to the post-policy sample (GEIH
2011/12), treatedi is an indicator that equals one if the workers belongs to the cohort affected by
the expansion in the tertiary education system (the workers is between 27 and 34 years of age),
g(expi) is a cubic polynomial on estimated experience,7 Xi are economic and sociodemographic
controls, specifically, the real GDP growth rate in the year of entry into the labor market, and
dummies for marital status, and φregion are region fixed effects.
The coefficient β4 in regression 3.7 captures the average effect on wages of being exposed to
the expansion of the tertiary education system.
Given that the period between the pre-policy and the post-policy samples was a period of high
economic growth for Colombia, with annual GDP growth rates larger than 3% in most years, labor
demand shifts, if present, should be positive and lead to larger wages. Thus, my results from the
reweighting method, if biased, should be overestimated. In contrast, since the main source of bias
in the differences-in-differences strategy is the changes in the composition of workers within level
of education, these results are likely to be underestimated. These imply that the results from these
two strategies can be interpreted as an upper and a lower bound on the effects of the policy on
the wage distribution, respectively. Therefore, only the combination of the results of these two
strategies will be informative regarding the direction of the changes in the wage distributions for
workers with different education levels.
3.5 RESULTS
This section presents results for the two empirical strategies discussed in the previous section.
The last subsection interprets how the two sets of results go together.
3.5.1 Reweighting method
As discussed in the Background section, the expansion of the tertiary education system led to
an increase in the proportion of young workers with tertiary education. Figure 3.4 looks, addi-
tionally, at changes in the distribution of workers by years of education. In panel A, the actual
7Estimated experience is computed as age - years of education - modal age of entering primary school (Card, 1999).
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distributions are showed for the pre-policy and the post-policy cohorts, while panel B shows the
reweighted pre-policy cohort (excluding education variables in the weight computation) and the
actual post-policy cohort. The first impression is that the two panels are very similar. The weights
can only account for changes in composition of the sample that are captured by the variables in-
cluded during the computation of the weight. Since the data I am using does not contain many
individual characteristics, unfortunately, the reweighting method does not seem to be very suc-
cessful at adjusting changes in composition of the sample.
Figure 3.5 shows the differences between the post-policy and the pre-policy densities for the
actual density estimates in graph A, and for the reweighted density in graph B. Graph B in Figures
3.4 and 3.5 show that there was a decrease in the density of workers with low education levels and
an increase in the density of workers with higher education levels, particularly of workers with
eleven or more years of education. The increase in the density for workers with more than 12 years
of education represents the rise in the proportion of workers completing tertiary education. These
results show that the probability of finding a worker with a high number of years of education is
higher for the post-policy sample and that the educational change affected, in fact, the distribution
of education characteristics in the labor force.
The effects on the wage distribution caused by these changes in the educational structure of
the labor force are shown in Figure 3.6. Panel 1 graph A shows the wage density estimate for
the post-policy and pre-policy samples. Graph B shows the reweighted pre-policy estimate of
the density of wages, accounting for changes in education, together with the post-policy estimate
of the density of wages. The reweighted pre-policy estimate of the density of wages represents
the wage distribution that would have prevailed if the wage structure had remained as in the
pre-policy sample but labor force characteristics had been those of the post-policy sample. Graph
C, additionally, accounts for changes in the economic conditions at the moment of entering the
labor market.8 This last adjustment allows to compare the post-policy sample wage distribution
to the wage distribution that would have prevailed if the wage structure had remained as in the
pre-policy sample, the labor force characteristics had been as in the post-policy sample and the
economic conditions when entering the labor market had remained constant. Thus, the pre-policy
8Oreopoulos, Heisz and Von Wachter (2012) show that economic conditions at the time of entering the labor market
have a persistent impact on wages.
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density estimates for graphs B and C are estimates of the counterfactual distribution of wages
if workers with the characteristics of the post-policy sample were subject to the pre-policy wage
structure.
Additionally, graphs A and B contain two vertical lines that represent the level of the minimum
hourly wage in 2001 and 2012, respectively. As shown in panel 1 of Figure 3.6, the minimum
hourly wage was not binding in Colombia in any of the two samples. There are two reasons for
that: first of all, since the minimum wage is set in terms of monthly wage, it is possible that some
workers are working more than the average hours of work and being paid the minimum monthly
wage, thus, receiving a lower hourly wage. Second, Colombia has a large informal sector that is
not subject to the minimum wage. Around 45-50% of the population was working in the informal
sector during the period studied, thus, it is possible that these workers were receiving hourly
wages below the minimum wage.9
Figure 3.7 shows the differences between different versions of the pre-policy density estimate
for the wage distribution and the post-policy wage distribution. Panel 1 graph A shows the es-
timate for the actual distribution of wages in the pre-policy sample, graph B reweights the pre-
policy sample by changes in composition and graph C additionally controls for GDP growth at
the time of entering the labor market. These differences show that, once the distribution of wages
for the post and the pre-policy samples are comparable, there is a shift in the distribution of wages
towards higher wages. This shift is reduced, though, when initial conditions in the economy are
taken into account. Thus, this suggests that the fact that Colombia was in an economic expansion
had a positive impact on the distribution of wages. However, the positive effect on wages remains
after controlling for economic conditions, which means that there were further increases in wages.
Since the reweighting method does not allow to control for labor demand shifts or productivity
increases, controlling by GDP growth may not be completely capturing these factors and these
results may be positively biased. Finally, the increase in the minimum wage seems to be shifting
the distribution of wages towards higher values, with the mode of the distribution moving to the
value of the minimum wage in 2012.
Densities in panels 2 to 4 of Figures 3.6 and 3.7 replicate the same structure as the previous
9See, Peña (2013) for more information on the size of the informal sector in Colombia.
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figures dividing workers by education level. First of all, panel 2 in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 look at
changes in the distribution of wages for workers with low levels of education, those with primary
education or less. These workers experience a shift to higher wages after the expansion of the
tertiary education system. According to Peña (2013), over 80% of workers in this education level
work in the informal sector, for this reason, the increase in the minimum wage is not likely to be the
main driver behind the shift in the wage distribution. In contrast, the shift in the wage distribution
is consistent with a Comparative Advantage interpretation in which the highest-skilled workers
for uneducated jobs remain uneducated after an expansion in higher levels of education. It should
be noted that other factors, such as productivity increases or labor demand shifts, could also have
pushed the wage distribution up for this level of education.
Panel 3 in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 shows changes in the wage distribution estimates for workers
with high school education. Graphs A and B in both figures suggest a shift towards higher wages,
consistent with the increase in the minimum wage,10 and a small decrease in wages for workers
at the top of the wage distribution for high school graduates. However, once I control for the
economic conditions at the time of entering the labor market, in graph C, the fall in density for the
highest wages becomes larger. This suggests that, thanks to the economic expansion, wages for
high school graduates increased. However, once economic conditions are kept constant, wages for
high school graduates seem to be concentrating around the new minimum wage, with a decrease
in the density of low and high wages in the distribution.
The fall in the density of high wages is consistent with the Signaling hypothesis. Since it is now
easier to access tertiary education, workers left in the high school graduate pool may be perceived
as less-skilled by employers and offered lower wages. The fall in density for low levels of wages
can be explained by the increase in the minimum wage, the 40% of high school graduates working
in the formal sector may now be receiving higher wages.
Finally, panel 4 in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show changes in the wage structure for workers that
completed tertiary education. In this case, all three graphs, even without reweighting by changes
in composition, show the same results. The increase in the proportion of tertiary education grad-
10In the case of high school graduates, around 60% of them worked in the informal sector and 40% in the formal
sector. This 40% could have been affected by the increase in the minimum wage and shifted the wage distribution
towards the new minimum wage.
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uates led to a decrease in wages of tertiary education graduates for workers at the top of the wage
distribution. Particularly, the density of wages appears to be bunching around the new minimum
wage. Since most workers with tertiary education work in the formal sector (over 60%), the mini-
mum wage was binding for their employers, creating an accumulation of the density just over the
minimum wage. This suggests that “highly-skilled” educated workers received lower wages after
the policy. Since tertiary graduates labor supply shifted up, the decrease in wages suggests that
labor demand for this level of education either did not shift up or, if it did, it shifted up by less
than the labor supply, reducing the price of labor, wages.
In summary, these results suggest that after the increase in the proportion of workers with
tertiary education, there was an increase in wages for workers with low levels of education, a de-
crease in dispersion for workers with high school education, and a decrease in wages for tertiary
education graduates at the top of the wage distribution, with an increase in the density of wages
just over the minimum wage. Workers at the top of the wage distribution for high school and ter-
tiary education graduates seem to have worsened wages in response to the policy, while workers
at the bottom of the wage distribution for primary education or less and high school graduates
seem to have benefited from the policy with an increase in wages.
3.5.2 Differences-in-differences
The second empirical strategy consists on using an older cohort within each one of the sam-
ples as a “control” group and carry out differences-in-differences in estimates of the wage density.
In this case, each panel in the Figure of interest contains three graphs. Graph A shows the den-
sity estimate for the “treated” cohort (workers between 27 and 34 years) and the “control” cohort
(workers between 37 and 44 years) in the post-policy sample, graph B shows the same two densi-
ties for workers in the pre-policy sample. Finally, graph C shows the differences-in-differences of
the wage densities, that means, it representes the difference in the wage density for the “treated”
and the “control” cohorts in the post-policy sample not explained by regular changes in the wage
structure. Since, in this case, I am using wages net of the effect of the labor market conditions at
the time of entering the labor market, I cannot plot the minimum wage levels.
Figure 3.8 looks at changes in the density of workers by years of education. Results using the
differences-in-differences strategy are very similar to those using the reweighting method: there
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is a fall in the density at low levels of education and an increase in the density at higher levels of
education, particularly at eleven or more years of education.
Changes in the wage distribution are showed in Figure 3.9. Graphs A and B in panel 1 show
almost identical wage density estimates for the “treated” and the “control” cohorts. Consequently,
the differences-in-differences of the wage estimate show very small and noisy changes in the wage
distribution for the cohort exposed to the expansion in the tertiary education system.
Since the reform implied easing the access to tertiary education, it is likely that the composition
of workers in each of the education levels worsened, as “lower-ability” students were completing
higher levels of education. For this reason, the wage density estimate for the “treated” cohort in
the post-policy sample within levels of education may be affected by these changes in composition
and, thus, downward biased. This needs to be taken into consideration when interpreting the
following results.
With regard to the distribution of wages for workers with low levels of education, primary
education or less, panel 2 in Figure 3.9 shows an imprecise shift towards higher wages, since there
was a lower difference between the wage distributions for “treated” and “control” workers in the
post-policy sample than in the pre-policy sample.
The distribution of wages for high school education graduates, however, shows smaller changes,
as shown in panel 3 in Figure 3.9. Also, wages for workers with this level of education seem to
be concentrating, with a fall in the density at high wages and some opposing effects for wages
at lower levels of the distribution. Since this strategy is not controlling for changes in worker
composition, the fall in the density of high wages is consistent, in this case, with an easier ac-
cess to tertiary education levels for “high-skilled” high school graduates, reducing the density of
“high-skilled” workers in the group of high school graduates.
Regarding wages for workers with tertiary education, the first result when looking at panel
4 in Figure 3.9 is that wages for this education level increase more rapidly with experience than
wages for other education levels, as shown by the lower wage density for the “treated” cohort with
respect to the “control” cohort in both samples. Once this change in the educational structure is
taken into account, graph C shows that the density of wages for workers exposed to the expansion
in the tertiary education system shifted towards lower wage levels.
Summarizing, this strategy shows no significant changes in the overall wage distribution, some
103
shift towards higher wages for workers with primary education or less, a small decrease in the
density at the top wages for workers with high school education, and a decrease in wages for
workers at the top of the wage distribution for tertiary education graduates.
Finally, table 3.2 shows the results for the differences-in-differences regression 3.7. This table
shows changes in average wages for workers exposed to the expansion in the tertiary education
system in each one of the education levels. Results in columns (1) and (2) show that the average
decrease in wages of younger workers with respect to older workers was larger in the post-policy
cohort, which may indicate that experience was more rewarded in the post-policy cohort for all
levels of education. However, once I control for job market experience, in columns (3)-(5), results
are not significant any more, suggesting that there were no significant effects on average wages.
This is consistent with the results discussed above, as in most cases there were small changes in
wage densities within the existing wage distribution, instead of clear shifts to higher or lower
wages.
Despite the lack of significance, the signs of the coefficients in columns (3)-(5) are generally
consistent with the changes observed in the wage distribution. Average wage for workers with
primary education or less increase, while average wages for workers with tertiary education de-
crease.
3.5.3 Reconciling results
As discussed in the Empirical Strategy section, both strategies used in this paper are subject to
biases. However, the direction of the possible biases differs for both strategies. In the case of the
reweighting method, while this method adjusts for changes in the composition of workers, results
are likely to be upward biased due to the favorable economic conditions that could have implied
labor demand shifts towards higher wages. Additionally, this method does not allow to control
for productivity shocks that, again, could have increased wages during the period.
In contrast, the differences-in-differences strategy can account for these biases as long as they
affected equally the wage structure for the “treated” and “control” cohorts. Even though this
advantage of the differences-in-differences method, this strategy does not allow to control for
changes in the composition of workers in general and, in particular, changes in the composition
of workers in each one of the education levels. As the reform studied eased the access to tertiary
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education levels and, additionally, there was an ongoing expansion of the high school education
level, it is likely that changes in the composition of workers by level of education were negative.
That means, it is likely that workers that did not progress to higher levels of education were those
of lower ability that would have received wages in the bottom of the wage distribution. Thus, if
there is a bias in the differences-in-differences estimate for changes in the wage distribution, this
bias is likely to be negative.
Since these two strategies are exposed to biases that go in opposite directions, only results
that indicate shifts in the same direction for both strategies can be trusted. For this reason, it is
important to interpret the two sets of results together.
The overall distribution of wages seems to shift to higher wages with the reweighting method,
partly caused by the increase in the minimum wage, while results are unclear with the differences-
in-differences strategy. In this case, since the composition of workers for the complete labor force
is less likely to change than the composition of workers within levels of education, I expect this
second method to lead to results with a smaller bias. Therefore, these results suggest that there
were no effects on the overall distribution of wages caused by the expansion in the tertiary edu-
cation system, but, there were increases in the wage distribution caused by labor demand shifts
or productivity changes that cannot be accounted for in the reweighting method, as well as an
increase in the minimum wage level.
Wages for workers with primary education or less increase using both strategies, despite the
fact that this shift is smaller for the differences-in-differences strategy. This result suggest that the
Comparative Advantage hypothesis may be holding in this case. The “best” uneducated workers
are the ones that stayed uneducated once there was an expansion in educational opportunities.
With regard to wages for workers with high school education, both strategies showed a de-
crease of the density at high levels of wages. Since the reweighting method is accounting for
changes in composition of workers, this cannot be explained by “highly-skilled” high school grad-
uates completing tertiary education in the post-policy sample. A possible explanation is the Sig-
naling hypothesis. As a result of the policy, it is cheaper and easier to access tertiary education in
the post-policy sample. Thus, workers that do not complete tertiary education are perceived as
signaling their “lower-ability” by employers and offered lower wages. This may have a stronger
impact on workers at the top of the wage distribution.
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Finally, both strategies show a decrease in the estimated density at the top wages of the tertiary
education wage distribution, with an increased bunching around the new minimum wage. This is
consistent with the largest participation of this group of workers in the formal labor market. The
decrease in the density of high wages can be explained simply in a supply and demand frame-
work. The expansion in the tertiary education system implied an increase in the supply of tertiary
education workers. In the case that the demand for these workers did not increase, or increased
less than the supply, wages for these workers should decrease. This result suggests that the in-
crease in the proportion of workers with tertiary education was sufficient to fulfill the ongoing
increase in the demand of educated workers caused by technological change, actually decreasing
tertiary education wage premium. Additionally, according to my results, workers at the top of the
wage distribution were the most affected by the negative change in wages.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
The effects of an increase in the proportion of college graduates on the college wage premium
have been extensively studied (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Teulings and van Rens, 2008). How-
ever, changes in the college wage premium may indicate changes in college graduate wages, high
school graduate wages, or both. Additionally, the effects on wages may be heterogeneous at dif-
ferent points of the wage distribution.
In this paper I use an expansion in the tertiary education system in Colombia in the mid-1990s
to identify the effects of a sudden increase in the proportion of workers with tertiary education on
the distribution of wages for workers with different levels of education. I use the timing of the pol-
icy and the fact that workers of different ages are not perfectly substitutable (Card and Lemieux,
2001) to carry out two different analysis. In the first one I build a counterfactual distribution of
wages replicating the composition of workers in the post-policy sample through the DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) reweighting method. In the second, I take differences-in-differences in
wage density estimates.
None of the two strategies are free from biases. However, since the main sources of bias in each
strategy go in opposite directions, the results from the first strategy are likely to be overestimated
while the results of the second strategy are likely to be underestimated. Thus, the interpretation
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of the results of these two strategies together allow to reach conclusions regarding the effects of
the expansion in the tertiary education system on the wage distribution.
My results show that labor demand shifts and productivity changes were the main drivers
behind the general increase in wages during the period. When looking at wage distributions by
levels of education, the only group of workers that benefited from the change in the educational
structure of the labor force were the least educated workers, workers with primary education or
less. This is consistent with a Comparative Advantage hypothesis in which only the “best” uned-
ucated workers remain “uneducated” and, thus, their wages increase. There is some decrease in
the density of wages at the top wage levels for workers with high school education. A possible
explanation is the Signaling hypothesis. Once the cost of accessing tertiary education is reduced,
“high ability” high school graduates can now complete tertiary education. Therefore, not com-
pleting tertiary education is perceived by employers as a signal of not being “high ability”, and
wages for high school graduates, and particularly those at the top, are reduced. These results
show that within a labor market, both, the Comparative Advantage hypothesis and the Signaling
hypothesis can hold for workers with different levels of education.
Regarding wages for tertiary education graduates, my results show a decrease in the density
at high levels of wages and an increase in bunching around the minimum wage. This suggests
that the growth in the demand of educated workers suggested by the Skill-Biased Technological
Change Hypothesis (e.g., Goldin and Katz, 1996; Autor, Krueger and Katz, 1998) was not large
enough to absorb the increase in educated workers in the labor market, implying a decrease in
wages for tertiary education graduates.
Finally, results on average wages show no significant changes for workers in any of the edu-
cation levels. This means that workers at different points of the wage distribution were affected,
as shown by the shifts in wage distribution estimates, but that these shifts did not affect average
wages.
These results imply that education policies may have heterogeneous effects for workers at dif-
ferent points of the wage distribution and may, additionally, affect workers that were not at the
margin of studying the education level that is expanded. Therefore, an analysis of average wages
or wage premia will give an incomplete picture of the actual effects of education policies on the
wage distribution. Finally, since the whole labor market can be affected by education policies, as
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shown in this paper, the possible effects on workers not directly exposed to the education policy
should also be taken into account.
TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 3.1: Origin of expansion in tertiary enrollment
Source: The World Bank, 2003. Tertiary Education in Colombia.
Paving the Way for Reform
Figure 3.2: Enrollment in tertiary education
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Figure 3.3: Proportion of workers by age and education level in ECH 2001/0202 and GEIH
2011/12
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Full sample Pre-policy sample Post-policy sample
(ECH 2001/02) (GEIH 2011/12)
Age 29.66 30.06 29.50
(2.04) (1.99) (2.04)
Male 0.554 0.564 0.550
(0.497) (0.496) (0.497)
Married 0.591 0.610 0.584
(0.492) (0.488) (0.493)
Basic education or less 0.166 0.241 0.136
(0.372) (0.427) (0.343)
Secondary education 0.498 0.527 0.486
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
Tertiary education 0.335 0.228 0.378
(0.472) (0.420) (0.485)
Employed 0.987 0.987 0.987
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
Self-employed 0.350 0.341 0.353
(0.477) (0.474) (0.478)
Wage per hour 2,232.14 1,800.37 2,380.72
(1,721.00) (1,488.86) (1,769.78)
Number of observations 80,056 19,135 60,921
Wage observations 40,992 9,637 31,355
Notes: Data for workers between 27 and 34 years of age for the pooled sample and by subsample, using sampling
weights. Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations of wage per hour over the 95th percentile or under the 5th
percentile were dropped. Wage per hour deflated to the 2001 value in Colombian pesos.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated distribution of years of education for workers between 27 and 34 years of
age
Figure 3.5: Differences in the distribution of years of education for workers between 27 and 34
years of age
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Figure 3.6: Estimated distribution of wages for workers between 27 and 34 years of age
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Figure 3.7: Differences in the distribution of wages for workers between 27 and 34 years of age
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Figure 3.8: Changes in distribution of years of education (Treated sample, Control Sample, Differ-
ences)
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Figure 3.9: Changes in distribution of wages (Treated sample, Control Sample, Differences)
Notes: Density estimate of the residual of a regression of log hourly wage in 2001 Colombian pesos on the GDP growth
on the year the worker entered the labor market for the first time, this means, net of the effects of initial labor market
conditions. 114
Table 3.2: Differences-in-difference regressions of average log wage per hour
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(wage per hour)
Panel A: All students
Post× Treatment -0.0607*** -0.0621*** -0.0117 -0.0139 -0.0111
(0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0355)
Observations 90,455 90,455 90,400 90,400 90,390
R-squared 0.195 0.200 0.208 0.213 0.213
Panel B: Students with primary education or less
Post× Treatment -0.00179 -0.00629 0.0191 0.0144 0.118
(0.0367) (0.0374) (0.0999) (0.0982) (0.0907)
Observations 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609
R-squared 0.006 0.027 0.043 0.052 0.058
Panel C: Students with high school education
Post× Treatment -0.0180 -0.0186 0.0392 0.0369 0.0417
(0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0257)
Observations 43,731 43,731 43,731 43,731 43,731
R-squared 0.003 0.023 0.025 0.032 0.032
Panel D: Students with tertiary education
Post× Treatment -0.0792* -0.0797* -0.0227 -0.0209 -0.00543
(0.0475) (0.0484) (0.0878) (0.0876) (0.0899)
Observations 29,060 29,060 29,060 29,060 29,050
R-squared 0.008 0.013 0.016 0.021 0.021
Region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience polynomial No No Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No No No Yes Yes
Economic controls No No No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Includes data for workers between 27
and 34 years of age and 37 and 44 years of age for the pre and post-policy samples.
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(A) Socioeconomic index 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.008)
(B) Mother with basic education or less -0.0001 -0.0038
(0.004) (0.003)
(C) Mother with high school education -0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
(D) Mother with university education 0.003 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. These regressions include all cohorts.
They use window of 90 days and include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.





(A) Log share of students -0.103*** -0.060*
(0.001) (0.001)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. These regressions include all cohorts.
They use window of 90 days and include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.
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Table A.3: Robustness – Alternative Student Classification – By municipality socieconomic index
terciles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables 1st SES 2nd SES 3rd SES All students
tercile tercile tercile
Probability of enrollment -0.0207** -0.0337*** -0.00528 -0.0146***
in public schools (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.00864) (0.00520)
Socioeconomic index 0.691 2.327** 1.150 -0.0972
(1st grade) (0.874) (0.957) (1.763) (0.824)
Class size -0.215 -0.530*** -0.244 -0.332***
(0.246) (0.198) (0.190) (0.107)
Average years of teaching -0.819*** -0.519*** -0.145 -0.411***
experience (1st-8th) (0.152) (0.152) (0.135) (0.0725)
Average Math and Spanish 0.0534*** 0.000167 0.00561 0.00347
standardized 4th grade test scores (0.0205) (0.0199) (0.0191) (0.0115)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a window
of 90 days, include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff and a full set of cohort dummies.
Table A.4: Robustness – Jump only in first year of policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Mothers with Mothers with Mothers with All students
basic high school university
Probability of enrollment -0.0168 -0.0274** -0.00883 -0.0108
in public schools (0.0175) (0.0110) (0.0176) (0.00805)
Socioeconomic index -0.803 -2.181 -3.850 -1.969
(1st grade) (1.583) (1.425) (4.489) (1.269)
Class size -0.427 -0.638*** -0.216 -0.573***
(0.443) (0.207) (0.447) (0.165)
Average years of teaching -0.800*** -0.687*** 0.0101 -0.535***
experience (1st-8th) (0.270) (0.157) (0.296) (0.114)
Average Math and Spanish 0.0946** -0.00986 0.0258 0.0147
standardized 4th grade test scores (0.0374) (0.0216) (0.0454) (0.0174)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a window
of 90 days, include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff and a full set of cohort dummies.
Including students around the enrollment cutoffs for 2006 and 2007.
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Table A.5: Robustness – Smaller bandwidth (30 days)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Mothers with Mothers with Mothers with All students
basic high school university
Probability of enrollment -0.0191 -0.0195 -0.0170 -0.0148
in public schools (0.0203) (0.0126) (0.0203) (0.00909)
Socioeconomic index 2.360 -0.290 9.848* 1.770
(1st grade) (1.820) (1.641) (5.205) (1.441)
Class size 0.272 -0.210 -0.233 -0.210
(0.509) (0.237) (0.523) (0.187)
Average years of teaching -0.989*** -0.653*** -0.413 -0.581***
experience (1st-8th) (0.306) (0.176) (0.339) (0.127)
Average Math and Spanish 0.0551 -0.0185 0.0732 0.0107
standardized 4th grade test scores (0.0434) (0.0252) (0.0546) (0.0202)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a window
of 90 days, include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff and a full set of cohort dummies.
Table A.6: Robustness – Linear spline changes between enrollment cutoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Mothers with Mothers with Mothers with All students
basic high school university
Probability of enrollment -0.0158 -0.0155** -0.0025 -0.0146***
in public schools (0.0116) (0.0072) (0.0115) (0.0052)
Socioeconomic index -0.086 -0.587 -0.643 -0.099
(1st grade) (1.047) (0.936) (2.957) (0.824)
Class size -0.156 -0.515*** 0.091 -0.332***
(0.292) (0.136) (0.295) (0.107)
Average years of teaching -0.589*** -0.494*** 0.012 -0.411***
experience (1st-8th) (0.175) (0.101) (0.194) (0.073)
Average Math and Spanish 0.0835*** -0.0241* 0.0174 0.0034
standardized 4th grade test scores (0.0248) (0.0144) (0.0309) (0.0115)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a window
of 90 days, include a linear spline of distance from birthday to the closest enrollment cutoff and a full set of cohort
dummies.
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Table A.7: Robustness – Fitting confounders in a linear trend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Mothers with Mothers with Mothers with All students
basic high school university
Probability of enrollment -0.0185 -0.0245*** 0.0102 -0.0161**
in public schools (0.0153) (0.00945) (0.0149) (0.00686)
Socioeconomic index -0.345 0.0403 -7.954** -0.678
(1st grade) (1.385) (1.222) (3.812) (1.086)
Class size -0.591 -0.816*** -0.0204 -0.581***
(0.386) (0.179) (0.381) (0.141)
Average years of teaching -1.268*** -0.993*** -0.0973 -0.821***
experience (1st-8th) (0.232) (0.132) (0.250) (0.0955)
Average Math and Spanish 0.124*** 0.0212 -0.00963 0.0445***
standardized 4th grade test scores (0.0324) (0.0186) (0.0390) (0.0149)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a window
of 90 days, include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff, a full set of cohort dummies and a
linear trend.
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Table A.8: Complier characteristics - family income and socioeconomic index distributions
(1) (2)
Municipality distribution National distribution
Panel A: Family income
1st quartile 0.434 0.183
(0.319) (0.316)
2nd quartile 0.729 1.438
(0.367) (0.638)
3rd quartile -0.130 -0.307
(0.330) (0.374)
4th quartile 0.106 -0.729
(0.341) (0.590)
Panel B: Socioeconomic index
1st quartile 0.209 0.334
(0.263) (0.262)
2nd quartile 0.882 0.290
(0.415) (0.286)
3rd quartile -0.173 0.406
(0.365) (0.310)




Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. Enrollment in
voucher and public school are instrumented with the interaction of the dummy of turning six after the enrollment
cutoff and the indicator for belonging to the treated cohorts.The regressions above use a window of 90 days, include all
years and a full set of cohort dummies. They also include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.
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Table A.9: Descriptive statistics by mother education level - Enrolled in post-policy period
Mothers with Mothers with high Mothers with
basic education school education university educ.
Panel A: Characteristics
Proportion of actual eligible students 0.58 0.34 0.11
(0.49) (0.47) (0.31)
Average socioeconomic index -114.4 6.0 166.5
(36.5) (64.3) (59.3)
Attend urban school 0.72 0.91 0.97
(0.45) (0.28) (0.17)
Average category of family income 2.4 4.1 9.0
(1.5) (2.7) (3.6)
Median monthly family income in category (2013 USD) 220 515 1,619
Panel B: National SES distribution
1st quartile 0.833 0.109 0.000
(0.373) (0.312) (0.000)
2nd quartile 0.159 0.342 0.001
(0.366) (0.474) (0.028)
3rd quartile 0.006 0.362 0.030
(0.075) (0.481) (0.172)
4th quartile 0.002 0.200 0.969
(0.040) (0.400) (0.174)
Panel C: Municipality SES distribution
1st quartile 0.772 0.143 0.006
(0.419) (0.350) (0.080)
2nd quartile 0.198 0.319 0.056
(0.398) (0.466) (0.231)
3rd quartile 0.027 0.337 0.148
(0.163) (0.437) (0.355)
4th quartile 0.003 0.234 0.885
(0.056) (0.423) (0.319)
Panel D: Enrollment choices
Proportion enrolled in public schools 0.65 0.37 0.12
(0.48) (0.48) (0.32)
Proportion enrolled in voucher schools 0.35 0.59 0.52
(0.48) (0.49) (0.50)
Proportion enrolled in elite private schools 0.00 0.04 0.36
(0.03) (0.19) (0.48)
Panel E: School characteristics at baseline
Average copay in schools in 2005 (2013 USD) 2.5 12.2 31.1
(8.0) (19.8) (31.1)
Average Math test scores in school in 2005 -0.23 0.08 0.58
(0.43) (0.47) (0.46)
Number of observations 124,205 373,142 76,359
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The descriptives above include all students in 1st grade in the
post-policy years (2008-2010). The average socioeconomic index is a weighted average of mother years of education
and family income normalized by municipality with mean equal to 100.
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Table B.1: School choices: 3rd quartile of the municipality socioeconomic distribution – Full
smaple
ITT estimates Difference in ITTs
(1) (2) (3)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students 0.019 -0.251** -0.270
(0.116) (0.124) (0.170)
Probability of enrolling in a low-performing school -0.003 -0.019*** -0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Probability of enrolling in an average-performing school -0.023* -0.033** -0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Probability of enrolling in a high-performing school 0.025** 0.056*** 0.032*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to
enrollment cutoff. Column (1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff
for year 2009, while column (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2)
with respect to column (1) including a full set of cohort dummies.
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(A) Socioeconomic index 2.140
(1.893)
(B) 1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.00309
(0.00809)
(C) 2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.00625
(0.00810)
(D) 3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.00111
(0.00808)
(E) 4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.00427
(0.00754)
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.00316
(0.00919)
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality -0.00316
(0.00919)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. These regressions include all cohorts.
They use window of 90 days and include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.





(A) Log share of students -0.0497*** -0.0707***
(0.00386) (0.00427)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. These regressions include all cohorts.
They use window of 90 days and include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.
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Table B.4: Students by category
School year 2009 2010 2011
Total students in 1st grade 70,847 69,055 68,074
Average socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) 29.5 30 28.2
Mothers with basic ed. or less 0.118 0.101 0.036
Mothers with high school or professional ed. 0.512 0.517 0.408
Mothers with university education 0.135 0.151 0.248
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.266 0.262 0.258
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.248 0.251 0.272
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.275 0.27 0.254
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.212 0.216 0.216
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.513 0.513 0.53
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.487 0.487 0.47
Table B.5: School demographics
School year 2009 2010 2011
Low-achieving schools (red)
Total students in 1st-4th grades 35,376 32,342 29,939
Average socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) -56.3 -56.8 -58.4
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.508 0.511 0.514
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.266 0.268 0.27
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.157 0.152 0.149
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.069 0.069 0.067
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.775 0.779 0.785
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.225 0.221 0.215
Average-achieving schools (yellow)
Total students in 1st-4th grades 166,472 160,456 155,242
Average socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) -2.8 -3.8 -5.9
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.3 0.301 0.303
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.279 0.281 0.285
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.247 0.247 0.245
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.173 0.171 0.167
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.579 0.581 0.588
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.421 0.419 0.412
High-achieving schools (green)
Total students in 1st-4th grades 85,090 86,566 87,020
Average socioeconomic index (standard dev.=100) 123.8 121.4 117.1
1st quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.116 0.117 0.118
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.181 0.18 0.192
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.352 0.352 0.343
4th quartile of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.351 0.35 0.347
Below median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.298 0.298 0.31
Above median of Socioeconomic index in municipality 0.702 0.702 0.69
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Table B.6: Robustness – Alternative school classification – Probability of enrollment in average-
performing schools (yellow) and in high-performing schools (green), 1st grade
Average-performing schools High-performing schools
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre 2009/10 2010/11 Post-Pre
All students -0.00762 -0.0427*** -0.0351** 0.0187* 0.0421*** 0.0234
(0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0156) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0147)
1st quartile of Socioeconomic 0.0133 -0.0178 -0.0311 0.00682 0.00245 -0.00437
index in municipality (0.0238) (0.0249) (0.0344) (0.0182) (0.0206) (0.0275)
2nd quartile of Socioeconomic -0.0419* -0.0219 0.0199 0.0445** 0.0245 -0.0200
index in municipality (0.0238) (0.0253) (0.0347) (0.0212) (0.0238) (0.0319)
3rd quartile of Socioeconomic -0.0233 -0.0813*** -0.0579 0.0151 0.102*** 0.0874**
index in municipality (0.0244) (0.0266) (0.0361) (0.0242) (0.0263) (0.0358)
4th quartile of Socioeconomic -0.0123 -0.0566** -0.0444 0.0227 0.0660** 0.0432
index in municipality (0.0274) (0.0281) (0.0393) (0.0276) (0.0285) (0.0397)
Below median of Socioeconomic -0.0143 -0.0209 -0.00665 0.0254* 0.0163 -0.00916
index in municipality (0.0168) (0.0178) (0.0244) (0.0140) (0.0159) (0.0212)
Above median of Socioeconomic -0.0180 -0.0696*** -0.0516* 0.0179 0.0851*** 0.0673**
index in municipality (0.0183) (0.0194) (0.0267) (0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0267)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate
regression. The regressions above use a window of 90 days and include only students attending schools in the
Santiago metropolitan area. They include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Column
(1) shows RD estimates using student observations within 90 days of the enrollment cutoff for year 2009, while col-
umn (2) for year 2010. Column (3) shows the differences in the RD coefficients for column (2) with respect to column (1).
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Table B.7: Robustness – Including 2008/09 cohort in pre-policy years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables All students 1st quart. 2nd quart. 3rd quart. 4th quart. Below SE Above SE
SE SE SE SE median median
Probability of enrollment 0.00360 0.00733 0.0187 -0.0333** -0.00973 0.0115 -0.0231**
in low-performing schools (0.00855) (0.0233) (0.0186) (0.0136) (0.0128) (0.0150) (0.00945)
Probability of enrollment in -0.0451*** -0.0336 -0.0302 -0.0922*** -0.0268 -0.0337 -0.0628***
average-performing schools (0.0137) (0.0301) (0.0310) (0.0322) (0.0350) (0.0216) (0.0237)
Probability of enrollment in 0.0448*** 0.0357 0.0153 0.129*** 0.0373 0.0288 0.0878***
high-performing schools (0.0129) (0.0238) (0.0285) (0.0319) (0.0353) (0.0188) (0.0237)
Average class size (1st grade) -0.0902 -0.230 -0.377 0.444 0.524 -0.295 0.492
(0.506) (0.512) (0.550) (0.353) (0.375)
Socioeconomic index 0.0753*** 0.00527 0.0579 0.234*** 0.115** 0.0396 0.180***
(1st grade) (0.0240) (0.0388) (0.0515) (0.0589) (0.0568) (0.0330) (0.0413)
School integration index -1.045** 0.695 -0.696 -2.141** -1.491 0.0750 -1.866**
(1st grade in %) (0.421) (0.914) (0.708) (0.894) (1.328) (0.585) (0.783)
Average years of teaching -0.345** -0.414 -0.671* -0.573* -0.623* -0.564** -0.605**
experience (0.151) (0.350) (0.347) (0.330) (0.364) (0.247) (0.245)
Math standardized -0.0284 -0.00590 -0.0811 0.0250 -0.0580 -0.0375 -0.0132
4th grade test scores (0.0302) (0.0643) (0.0629) (0.0619) (0.0644) (0.0453) (0.0447)
Spanish standardized 0.00915 0.000652 -0.0374 0.0545 0.0455 -0.0125 0.0498
4th grade test scores (0.0297) (0.0628) (0.0623) (0.0612) (0.0637) (0.0445) (0.0442)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a window
of 90 days, include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff. Includes students around the
enrollment cutoffs for 2008, 2009 and 2010.
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Table B.8: Robustness – Smaller bandwidth (45 days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables All students 1st quart. 2nd quart. 3rd quart. 4th quart. Below SE Above SE
SE SE SE SE median median
Probability of enrollment -0.0176 0.0175 -0.0127 -0.0618*** -0.0187 -5.99e-05 -0.0430***
in low-performing schools (0.0139) (0.0377) (0.0299) (0.0213) (0.0217) (0.0242) (0.0152)
Probability of enrollment in -0.0197 -0.0736 0.000217 -0.0452 0.0391 -0.0379 -0.00889
average-performing schools (0.0221) (0.0484) (0.0493) (0.0519) (0.0562) (0.0346) (0.0382)
Probability of enrollment in 0.0370* 0.0642* 0.0106 0.108** -0.0165 0.0410 0.0541
high-performing schools (0.0208) (0.0381) (0.0451) (0.0512) (0.0567) (0.0298) (0.0381)
Average class size (1st grade) 0.347 0.329 -0.0365 0.609 0.861 0.162 0.761
(0.359) (0.786) (0.817) (0.837) (0.878) (0.567) (0.607)
Socioeconomic index 0.0511 -0.0279 0.0766 0.201** 0.0333 0.0346 0.128*
(1st grade) (0.0382) (0.0613) (0.0807) (0.0940) (0.0910) (0.0518) (0.0660)
School integration index -0.202 1.963 -0.717 -2.132 -0.655 0.780 -1.558
(1st grade in %) (0.669) (1.483) (1.101) (1.382) (2.100) (0.936) (1.227)
Average years of teaching -0.472* 0.0434 -1.012* -0.813 -1.363** -0.516 -1.075***
experience (0.242) (0.560) (0.551) (0.529) (0.584) (0.395) (0.393)
Math standardized 0.0413 0.0283 0.0374 0.121 -0.0461 0.0406 0.0510
4th grade test scores (0.0496) (0.106) (0.102) (0.102) (0.107) (0.0741) (0.0737)
Spanish standardized 0.0723 0.0977 0.0568 0.109 0.0128 0.0820 0.0715
4th grade test scores (0.0486) (0.103) (0.101) (0.0990) (0.107) (0.0728) (0.0726)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions above use a window
of 45 days, include a linear spline of distance from birthday to enrollment cutoff.
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Table B.9: Enrollment within type of student
School year 2009 2010 2011
(A) All students
Enrolled in low-achieving schools (red) 0.12 0.108 0.104
Enrolled in average-achieving schools (yellow) 0.572 0.566 0.563
Enrolled in high-achieving schools (green) 0.303 0.316 0.321
(B) 1st quartile of Socioeconomic index distribution in municipality
Enrolled in low-achieving schools (red) 0.202 0.18 0.159
Enrolled in average-achieving schools (yellow) 0.655 0.663 0.659
Enrolled in high-achieving schools (green) 0.136 0.147 0.173
(C) 2nd quartile of Socioeconomic index distribution in municipality
Enrolled in low-achieving schools (red) 0.113 0.104 0.084
Enrolled in average-achieving schools (yellow) 0.662 0.645 0.609
Enrolled in high-achieving schools (green) 0.22 0.239 0.297
(D) 3rd quartile of Socioeconomic index distribution in municipality
Enrolled in low-achieving schools (red) 0.065 0.051 0.045
Enrolled in average-achieving schools (yellow) 0.526 0.522 0.503
Enrolled in high-achieving schools (green) 0.403 0.415 0.439
(E) 4th quartile of Socioeconomic index distribution in municipality
Enrolled in low-achieving schools (red) 0.034 0.03 0.027
Enrolled in average-achieving schools (yellow) 0.477 0.445 0.434
Enrolled in high-achieving schools (green) 0.487 0.516 0.524
(F) Below median of Socioeconomic index distribution in municipality
Enrolled in low-achieving schools (red) 0.159 0.143 0.121
Enrolled in average-achieving schools (yellow) 0.658 0.654 0.633
Enrolled in high-achieving schools (green) 0.177 0.192 0.236
(G) Below median of Socioeconomic index distribution in municipality
Enrolled in low-achieving schools (red) 0.051 0.041 0.037
Enrolled in average-achieving schools (yellow) 0.505 0.488 0.471
Enrolled in high-achieving schools (green) 0.439 0.46 0.478
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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Figure C.1: Average wages by age
Figure C.2: Average wages per hour by age and education level in ECH 2001/0202 and GEIH
2011/12
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